Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hillas, John; Samet, Dov
• 署名单位: University of Auckland; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.005
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: Dominance rationality; Strict dominance; Weak dominance; Common knowledge of rationality; correlated equilibrium

摘要

We study new non-Bayesian solutions of games in strategic form, based on four notions of dominance: weak or strict domination by either a pure or a mixed strategy. For each of these types of dominance, d, we define a family of sets of strategy profiles, called d correlated equilibria. We study the structure and properties of these families. A player is d dominance rational when she does not play a strategy that is d-dominated relative to what she knows about the play of the other players. A set of profiles is a d-correlated equilibrium if and only if it is the set of profiles played in a model where d-dominance rationality is commonly known. When d denotes strict domination by a mixed strategy, a set of profiles is a d-correlated equilibrium if and only if it is the set of profiles played in a model where Bayesian rationality is commonly known. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.