Efficiency in asymmetric auctions with endogenous reserve prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kirkegaard, Rene
• 署名单位: University of Guelph
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.007
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 234-239
• 关键词: Asymmetric auctions; EFFICIENCY; reserve prices

摘要

In the standard independent private values model, the second-price auction (SPA) is generally taken to be more efficient than the first-price auction (FPA) when bidders are asymmetric. However, this conclusion assumes that reserve prices are identical across auctions. This paper endogenizes the reserve price and shows that it may be lower in the FPA. Hence, gains from trade are realized more often in the FPA. This effect may make the FPA more efficient than the SPA. Indeed, the FPA may Pareto dominate the SPA. That is, the FPA may be more profitable and yet be preferred by all bidders. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.