Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rosa, Benjamin, V
• 署名单位: University of Kentucky
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2021.12.009
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 189-203
• 关键词: Bid credits; Simultaneous ascending auctions; Exposure problem; spectrum auctions

摘要

I study the impact of bid credits on simultaneous ascending auctions in a model where bidders potentially have complementary values. Although bid credits can lead to a more equitable distribution of items, I find an additional unintended consequence: bidders without credits are more exposed to winning a less desirable set of items and will drop out of the auction sooner when their competitors have credits. Calibrating the model to data from the Federal Communication Commission's sale of licenses in the 700 MHz guard bands, I find exposure reduced average non-credited dropout values by 5.7 percent but did not decrease revenues. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.