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作者：Grunewald, Andreas; Krakel, Matthias
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; University of Bonn
摘要：In the last decade, social media and the Internet have amplified the possibility to circulate false information among an audience, which has become a serious threat to the credibility of politicians, organizations, and other decision makers. This paper proposes a framework for investigating the incentives to strategically manipulate the audience's belief under different institutions and in various competitive environments. We show that more rigorous institutions against information manipulatio...
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作者：Gersbach, Hans; Mamageishvili, Akaki; Tejada, Oriol
作者单位：Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Barcelona
摘要：A population of identical individuals must choose one of two alternatives under uncertainty about the state of the world. Individuals can acquire different levels of costly information and complete contracts are not feasible. For such a setup, we investigate how vote delegation to a committee and suitable monetary transfers for its members can ensure that high or optimal levels of information are (jointly) acquired. We show that for a (stable) committee that uses the majority rule to maximize ...
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作者：Pevnitskaya, Svetlana; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：We use a laboratory experiment to study decisions in a dynamic game where firms' private production leads to accumulation of a public bad, such as pollution. Firms have an option to invest in clean technology, which proportionally lowers their emissions, or contributions to the public bad. The main treatment variable is the type of access to clean technology, or benefits from such investment, which can be private or common. Under private access, investment reduces the firm's own propensity to ...
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作者：Aoyagi, Masaki; Yoo, Seung Han
作者单位：University of Osaka; Korea University
摘要：A platform offers sellers and buyers trading opportunities by creating one-to-one matches between them. A matching mechanism specifies subscription fees and the probabilities with which each seller type is matched with each buyer type. When the subscribers are fully strategic in their interactions with their matched partners, the optimal mechanism may not employ socially efficient positive assortative matching (PAM) but instead focus on the extraction of the agents' informational rents. In alt...
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作者：Fahn, Matthias; Seibel, Regina
作者单位：Johannes Kepler University Linz; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of Zurich
摘要：We study optimal employment contracts for present-biased employees if firms cannot commit to long-term contracts. Assuming that an employee's effort increases his chances to obtain a future benefit, we show that individuals who are naive about their present bias will actually be better off than sophisticated or time-consistent individuals. Moreover, firms might benefit from being ignorant about the extent of an employee's naivet & eacute;. Our results also indicate that naive employees might b...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Lyu, Youji; Wu, Zenan; Zhang, Yuanjie
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Nankai University; Peking University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-player lottery contest in which heterogeneous contestants exhibit reference-dependent loss aversion a la Ko?szegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). We verify the existence and uniqueness of pure-strategy choice-acclimating personal Nash equilibrium (CPNE) under moderate loss aversion and fully characterize the equilibrium. The equilibrium sharply contrasts with that in the two-player risk-neutral symmetric case. Loss aversion can lead contestants' individual efforts to change ...
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作者：Wu, Bin
作者单位：Capital University of Economics & Business
摘要：A general condition called coarser traits is introduced and shown to be necessary and sufficient for the idealized limit property of large games with traits. Moreover, we illustrate the minimality of the coarser traits condition by showing its necessity in deriving the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in large games with traits. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Rampal, Jeevant
作者单位：Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad; Indian Institute of Management (IIM System); Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad
摘要：This paper models a scenario where finite perfect-information games are distorted in two ways. First, each player can have different possible levels of foresight, where foresight is a particular number of future stages that the player can observe/understand from each of her moves. In particular, each player's foresight is allowed to be limited or insufficient to observe the entire game from each move. Second, there is uncertainty about each opponent's foresight. I define the Limited Foresight ...
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作者：Chellig, Jordan; Durbac, Calina; Fountoulakis, Nikolaos
作者单位：University of Birmingham
摘要：We consider evolutionary games on a population whose underlying topology of interactions is determined by a binomial random graph G(n, p). Our focus is on 2-player symmetric games with 2 strategies played between the incident members of such a population. Players update their strategies synchronously: each player selects the strategy that is the best response to the current set of strategies its neighbours play. We show that such a system reduces to generalised majority and minority dynamics. ...
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作者：Orlova, Olena
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：We consider a fixed network of players endowed with idiosyncratic preferences over actions and involved in interactions of various types. The aim is to investigate the interplay between idiosyncratic preferences and interactional incentives on a network. The earlier literature demonstrated the conflict between players' intrinsic preferences and coordination incentives. This paper shows that such a conflict is also present in contexts in which players do not necessarily aim at coordination with...
