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作者：Barthel, Anne -Christine; Hoffmann, Eric; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; West Texas A&M University; University of Kansas
摘要：In game theory, p-dominance and its set-valued generalizations serve as important robust solution concepts. We show that in monotone games, (which include the broad classes of supermodular games, submodular games, and their combinations) these concepts can be characterized in terms of pure strategy Nash equilibria in an auxiliary game of complete information. The auxiliary game is constructed in a transparent manner that is easy to follow and retains a natural connection to the original game. ...
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作者：Rao, Neel
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
摘要：This article studies a wage posting game in which workers invest in human capital so as to reduce the disutility of labor. If investment were observable, then no workers would invest in skills due to the holdup problem, and all employers would offer the monopsony wage as in the Diamond paradox. With unobservable investment, however, the equilibrium wage and skill distributions are nondegenerate, despite agents being ex ante identical. An asymptotic efficiency result is obtained in which invest...
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作者：Kaya, Ayca; Roy, Santanu
作者单位：University of Miami; Southern Methodist University
摘要：Markets differ in the availability of past trading records of their participants. In a repeated sale model with adverse selection, we study the impact of the availability of such records on trading outcomes. We consider regimes varying with respect to the length of the available records. We characterize a class of equilibria in which the record length has direct welfare implications via the market's need to re-screen the seller, as well as indirect implications via the low quality seller's inc...
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作者：Juarez, Noelia; Neme, Pablo; Oviedo, Jorge
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET)
摘要：We study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings for a many-to-many matching market. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two natural binary operations for computing the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound for each side of the matching market. Then we prove that with these binary operations the set of random stable matchings forms two distributive lattices for the appropriate partial order, one for each side of the market. Moreover, thes...
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作者：Macault, Emilien; Scarsini, Marco; Tomala, Tristan
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：We consider a discrete-time nonatomic routing game with variable demand and uncertain costs. Given a routing network with single origin and destination, the cost function of each edge depends on some uncertain persistent state parameter. At every period, a random traffic demand is routed through the network according to a Wardrop equilibrium. The realized costs are publicly observed and the public Bayesian belief about the state parameter is updated. We say that there is strong learning when b...
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作者：Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Schmeidler, David
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed epsilon-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive s. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973) pointed out by Shapley. (C) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.
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作者：Heggedal, Tom-Reiel; Helland, Leif; Morton, Rebecca
作者单位：BI Norwegian Business School; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：We investigate the effects of wages and uncertainty on political corruption as measured by rent-taking. First, our laboratory data show that contrary to standard theory, rent-taking is not independent of, but decreases with wages in the absence of popularity shocks. Second, the orthodox view that rent-taking is greater in the presence of popularity shocks, given wages, is not necessarily true. Third, we find that in the presence of popularity or ideological shocks rent-taking is increasing in ...
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作者：Takeuchi, Ai; Veszteg, Robert F.; Kamijo, Yoshio; Funaki, Yukihiko
作者单位：Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
摘要：Using experimental data, we show that the characteristics of the joint production process have a notable impact on the distribution of bargaining agreements. The setting in which the jointly produced surplus is expressed to be proportional to individual inputs leads to significantly more proportional bargaining agreements. This is in contrast to the setting in which the surplus is expressed as an additive constant, where bargaining agreements are more in line with the Nash bargaining solution....
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作者：Bilancini, Ennio; Boncinelli, Leonardo
作者单位：IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; University of Florence
摘要：We study the long run convention emerging from stag hunt interactions when agents occasionally revise their action over time adopting a perturbed myopic best response rule, with the novelty of introducing social competition in the form of assignment of prizes to agents depending on the payoff ranking resulting from the stag hunt interaction. We find that social competition plays a crucial and articulated role in the selection of the long run convention: indeed, a high enough reward from compet...
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作者：Iwase, Yusuke; Tsuruta, Shoya; Yoshimura, Akina
作者单位：University of Tokyo; Boston College
摘要：We consider a school choice problem under general priorities with ties. Priorities in practice are usually complex since a school may rank students equally or care about an affirmative action policy. Thus, we do not specify a class of priorities already known, but abstractly treat all priorities such that a stable matching exists for all students' preference profiles. For those priorities, it is unknown whether stable matchings are achievable when students are strategic. We show that a stable ...
