-
作者：Biro, Peter; Klijn, Flip; Papai, Szilvia
作者单位：Hungarian Academy of Sciences; HUN-REN; HUN-REN Centre for Economic & Regional Studies; Institute of Economics - HAS; Corvinus University Budapest; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; Concordia University - Canada
摘要：We study generalized Shapley-Scarf exchange markets where each agent is endowed with multiple units of an indivisible and agent-specific good and monetary compensations are not possible. An outcome is given by a circulation which consists of a balanced exchange of goods. We focus on circulation rules that only require as input ordinal preference rankings of individual goods, and agents are assumed to have responsive preferences over bundles of goods. We study the properties of serial dictators...
-
作者：Guo, Huiyi; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
作者单位：Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Iowa
摘要：The paper introduces coalition structures to study belief-free full implementation. When the mechanism designer does not know which coalitions are admissible, we provide necessary and almost sufficient conditions on when a social choice function is robustly coalitionally implementable, i.e., implementable regardless of the coalition pattern and the belief structure. Robust coalitional implementation is a strong requirement that imposes stringent conditions on implementable social choice functi...
-
作者：Shuai, Jie; Yang, Huanxing; Zhang, Lan
作者单位：Zhongnan University of Economics & Law; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University; Beijing Normal University
摘要：This paper studies competitive bundling in an oligopoly market with one multi-product dominant firm and several symmetric small firms. In the model of (competing against) specialists each small firm produces a single product, while in the model of (competing against) generalists each small firm produces multiple products. In the model of specialists, we show that the dominant firm will bundle if and only if its dominance level is relatively high. In the model of generalists, the dominant firm'...
-
作者：D'Agostino, Elena; Seidmann, Daniel J.
作者单位：University of Messina; University of Nottingham
摘要：Is it better to present evidence first or second in trials if witnesses cannot lie, and the litigants share all available witnesses? We address this question by defining preferences over playing games via their equilibrium correspondences. Exploiting this partial ordering over games, we show that litigants cannot prefer to lead, but can prefer to follow; the judge/jury may also prefer some litigant to lead, but only if the litigants each prefer to follow. Allowing a litigant to choose whether ...
-
作者：Satterthwaite, Mark A.; Williams, Steven R.; Zachariadis, Konstantinos E.
作者单位：Northwestern University; University of Melbourne; University of London; Queen Mary University London
摘要：We investigate equilibrium in the buyer's bid double auction (BBDA) in a model with correlated private values/costs. Using a combination of theorems and computed examples, we demonstrate that simple equilibria exist even in small markets. Moreover, we bound traders' strategic behavior as a function of market size and derive rates of convergence to zero of (i) inefficiency in the allocation caused by strategic behavior and (ii) the error in the market price as an estimate of the rational expect...
-
作者：Kellner, Christian; Le Quement, Mark T.; Riener, Gerhard
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of East Anglia; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：Ambiguous language is ubiquitous and often deliberate. Recent theoretical work (Bose and Renou, 2014; Kellner and Le Quement, 2018; Beauchene et al., 2019) has shown how language ambiguation can improve outcomes by mitigating conflict of interest. Our experiment finds a significant effect of language ambiguation on subjects who are proficient at Bayesian updating. For ambiguity averse subjects within this population, a significant part of this effect operates via the channel of subjects' desir...
-
作者：Chawla, Shuchi; Devanur, Nikhil R.; Karlin, Anna R.; Sivan, Balasubramanian
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Amazon.com; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated
摘要：We consider a pricing problem where a buyer is interested in purchasing/using a good, such as an app or music or software, repeatedly over time. The consumer discovers his value for the good only as he uses it, and the value evolves with each use. In this paper, we explore the performance of a class of pricing mechanisms that are extremely simple for both the buyer and the seller to use: the seller offers the product for free for a certain number of uses, and then charges an appropriate fixed ...
-
作者：Deimen, Inga; Wirtz, Julia
作者单位：University of Arizona; University of Bristol
摘要：We study effort provision and the development of the belief that effort matters over time: a student is uncertain whether she has control over success through her effort or whether success is determined by her innate ability, which she also does not know. In each period, what she can learn about her control and her ability depends on the level of effort she exerts. The student's optimal effort policy in this two-dimensional bandit problem takes the form of a linear belief cutoff rule and typic...
-
作者：Cui, Zhiwei; Shi, Fei
作者单位：Renmin University of China; Shanghai Jiao Tong University
摘要：We consider a model where players can actively form a limited number of links with other players to play a general class of size-dependent coordination games. This class of games includes multi-person binary action coordination games, minimum effort games, average opinion games, and others, and it is mainly characterized by strategic complementarities among actions. Whenever players may only support links to a relatively small number of other players, the most efficient convention will be sele...
-
作者：Basic, Zvonimir; Quercia, Simone
作者单位：Max Planck Society; University of Bonn; University of Verona
摘要：We investigate the influence of self and social image concerns as potential sources of lying costs across two studies (n = 991). In Experiment 1, in a standard die-rolling paradigm, we exogenously manipulate self-awareness and observability, which direct the focus of a person on their private and public selves, respectively. We find that our self-awareness manipulation has no effect on overreporting in comparison to a control treatment, while our observability manipulation significantly decrea...
