Informational robustness of common belief in rationality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ziegler, Gabriel
• 署名单位: University of Edinburgh
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.025
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 592-597
• 关键词: Informational robustness; rationalizability; incomplete information; Bayesian game

摘要

In this note, I explore the implications of informational robustness under the assumption of common belief in rationality. That is, predictions for incomplete-information games which are valid across all possible information structures. First, I address this question from a global perspective and then generalize the analysis to allow for localized informational robustness. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.