Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Gomes, Armando
• 署名单位: Washington University (WUSTL)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.010
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 463-477
• 关键词: Coalitional bargaining; Voting games; Multilateral negotiations; Stochastic and dynamic games; Bargaining theory

摘要

We propose a new solution for coalition bargaining problems among n players that can form coalitions c generating heterogenous coalitional values S-c is an element of R. The players' values v(i) and probability of coalition formation mu(c) are given by: V-i = Sigma(C subset of W) (delta V-i + gamma) I (i is an element of C)mu(C) and Sigma(C subset of W) mu(C) = 1, where coalition c is chosen only if it maximizes the average gain gamma(C) = 1/vertical bar C vertical bar (S-C - delta Sigma(j is an element of C) V-j) and gamma (math) max(C is an element of W) gamma(c). This solution is the strong Markov perfect equilibrium of a noncooperative coalition bargaining game where players choose simultaneously the coalition they want to join followed by negotiations to split the surplus. The solution does not rely on the specification of a proposer recognition protocol. For majority voting games, the solution exhibits more inequality among the values of large and small parties and a concentrated equilibrium coalition formation distribution. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.