Anonymous, non-manipulable binary social choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Basile, Achille; Rao, Surekha; Rao, K. P. S. Bhaskara
• 署名单位: University of Naples Federico II; Indiana University System; Indiana University Northwest; Indiana University System; Indiana University Northwest
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.02.007
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 138-149
• 关键词: social choice functions; Non-manipulability; anonymity; Veto; Quota majority; Weak preferences

摘要

Let V be a society whose members express weak preferences about two alternatives. We show simple representation formulae that are valid for all, and only, the elements of various classes of non-manipulable social choice functions on V. We represent the entire class of the non-manipulable social choice functions, and various of its subclasses corresponding to further properties. We focus mainly on anonymity. Efficiency and neutrality up to one voter are also considered. As a consequence of the representation formulae, the cardinalities of some of these classes are also established. Notably, we show that the number of anonymous and non-manipulable social choice functions on V is 2(n+1) if V contains n members. (C) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.