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作者：Cheng, Xiaoyu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous informa...
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作者：Lehrer, Ehud; Shaiderman, Dimitry
作者单位：Durham University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：This paper examines information transmission games where the sender knows the realizations of states from a Markov process, but his informational advantage is counteracted by outside, random revelations to the receiver. For very patient players, we characterize the sender's value of the game with outside revelations in terms of the value without outside revelations. Through our characterization, we identify that, in contrast with the sender-receiver games with fixed states, the sender may bene...
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作者：Manocha, Kriti; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-period college admissions problem where schools' choice rules incorporate affirmative action constraints. Students have the option to either finalize their assignments at the end of each period or participate in subsequent periods with the possibility of updating their rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We show that a gradual matching mechanism makes active students weakly better off (i.e. satisfies monotonicity) if and only if their ROL update rule meets a mild regularity c...
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作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Khan, Abhimanyu
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We propose a decision-theoretic and cognitive-hierarchy based notion of network stability by examining the decision-making nodes' incentives to change the structure of a network by establishing/dissolving links in between them. While evaluating the desirability of initiating such changes, each node internalizes, to the extent of its limited foresight, the effect of further changes that may be induced thereafter. The nodes may exhibit heterogeneity in their level of foresight, and coalitions of...
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作者：Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud
作者单位：Universite Paris-VIII; Lancaster University
摘要：We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent...
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作者：Sekeris, Petros G.
摘要：In this article we explore how propaganda relates to conflict initiation. In the presence of propaganda, if conflict is highly destructive, parties invest in armaments to improve their share of the pie at the negotiation table. If conflict is lowly destructive, peace is never reached and arming is implemented to boost the troops' morale and fighting efficiency. For intermediate destruction levels, the game only admits mixed strategy equilibria where peace and conflict occur probabilistically. ...
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作者：Chuan, Amanda; Zhang, Hanzhe
作者单位：Michigan State University; Michigan State University
摘要：We theoretically and experimentally investigate psychological motivations behind pay-it-forward behavior. We construct a psychological game-theoretic model that incorporates altruism, inequity aversion, and indirect reciprocity following Rabin (1993), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). We test this model using games in which players choose to give to strangers, potentially after receiving a gift from an unrelated benefactor. Our experiment reveals that altruism an...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Muir, Ellen, V
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The ability of larger markets to mitigate the incentive problem created by private information has been the focus of a sizable economics literature. In contrast, the fact that thicker markets also reduce the double coincidence of wants problem has received little attention. Modeling thin markets as bilateral trade involving independent private values and thick markets as Walrasian markets with a continuum of traders, we analyze and quantify the matching benefits of market thickness. These bene...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui
作者单位：Harbin Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Naono, Miharu
作者单位：Kyoto University
摘要：Maxmin decision making can take place at an individual or a coalitional level. We allow evolution to choose between the two, determining the relative shares of individual and coalitional decision making. We consider factors that favor or disfavor the evolution of coalitionality and apply our framework to social dilemmas, oligopolistic price competition and voting on committees.
