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作者：Brandt, Felix; Dong, Chris; Peters, Dominik
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Universite PSL; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite Paris-Dauphine
摘要：A voting rule is a Condorcet extension if it returns a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise majority comparisons whenever one exists. Condorcet extensions have faced criticism due to their susceptibility to variable-electorate paradoxes, especially the reinforcement paradox (Young and Levenglick, 1978) and the no-show paradox (Moulin, 1988b). In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Condorcet extensions to these paradoxes for the case of exactly three candidates. F...
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作者：Meier, Martin; Perea, Andres
作者单位：Free University of Bozen-Bolzano; Maastricht University
摘要：We propose a model of reasoning in dynamic games in which a player, at each information set, holds a conditional belief about his own future choices and the opponents' future choices. These conditional beliefs are assumed to be cautious, that is, the player never completely rules out any feasible future choice by himself or the opponents. We impose the following key conditions: (a) a player always believes that he will choose rationally in the future, (b) a player always believes that his oppo...
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作者：Galichon, A.; Jacquet, A.
作者单位：New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
摘要：Matching problems with linearly transferable utility (LTU) generalize the well-studied transferable utility (TU) case by relaxing the assumption that utility is transferred one-for-one within matched pairs. We show that LTU matching problems can be reframed as nonzero-sum hide-and-seek games between two players, thus generalizing a result from von Neumann. The underlying linear programming structure of TU matching problems, however, is lost when moving to LTU. These results draw a new bridge b...
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作者：Peralta, Esteban
作者单位：University of Michigan; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：This paper shows that, within familiar environments with transferable utilities, the set of unmatched agents is the same across all allocations that are stable in markets with one-sided incomplete information. The result does not hold in markets without transfers.
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作者：Gaunersdorfer, Andrea; Hofbauer, Josef
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Vienna
摘要：A game is unprofitable if equilibrium payoffs do not exceed the maximin payoff for each player. In an unprofitable game, Nash equilibrium play has been notoriously difficult to justify. For a class of 3x3 games we analyze whether evolutionary and learning processes lead to Nash play. We find that neither the pure Nash equilibrium nor the pure maximin strategy are stable rest points under the studied dynamics whereas the mixed Nash equilibrium and the quantal response equilibrium may be attract...
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作者：Bao, Leo; Gangadharan, Lata; Leister, C. Matthew
作者单位：Monash University; Monash University
摘要：We propose a deterrence mechanism that utilizes insider information acquired by criminals through customary practices. Under this mechanism, a suspect caught committing a criminal act can nominate a peer who has committed a similar offense, with only the more severe offender facing penalties. Theoretical analyses indicate that, under general conditions, our mechanism drives the best-response dynamic downwards compared to the commonly used regulatory practice of penalizing only the first suspec...
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作者：Roy, Jaideep; Saha, Bibhas
作者单位：University of Bath; Durham University
摘要：When artificial intelligence (AI) displaces lower-skilled workers with higher intensity, electoral democracies may slow down automation in fear of unemployment and voter resentment. Using a Downsian model of elections where parties promise to limit automation and redistribute automation surplus, we show that when automation is highly productive democracies implement maximum automation, making all workers vulnerable to redundancy and distribute the entire surplus among the working population. M...
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作者：Sethi, Ravideep; Verriest, Ewout
作者单位：University of Utah; Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We consider an infinitely repeated legislative bargaining model with a dynamically evolving status quo. Three players, one of whom is permanently endowed with veto power, must split a fixed budget in each period. Despite her additional power, the veto player cannot always asymptotically extract the full surplus. The non-veto players endogenously prevent each other's expropriation when they are patient and have high initial allocations in the unique stationary, symmetric, stageundominated, coal...
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作者：Jalota, Devansh; Ostrovsky, Michael; Pavone, Marco
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study two-sided many-to-one matching markets with transferable utilities in which money can exchange hands between matched agents, subject to distributional constraints on the set of feasible allocations. In such markets, we establish that equilibrium arrangements are surplus-maximizing and study the conditions on the distributional constraints under which equilibria exist and can be computed efficiently when agents have linear preferences. Our main result is a linear programming duality me...
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作者：Malcomson, James M.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Employees are divided into grades. Toyota places suppliers into only a small number of This paper shows that grouping of privately informed and persistent agent types arises in relational incentive contracts when agent type is continuous. Malcomson (2016) showed full separation is not possible if, following full revelation of an agent's type, payoffs for and agent are on the Pareto frontier. This paper shows how much separation can be Specifically, it characterizes the finest partitioning that...
