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作者：Bardal, Tuva; Endriss, Ulle
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of Amsterdam
摘要：Approval-based scoring rules require participants to submit ballots that correspond to the candidates they approve of, and each candidate then receives some score from each ballot it appears on. One particularly natural class of approval-based scoring rules is the class of size-approval rules. For rules in this class, each ballot is weighted based on the number of candidates it contains. We provide a deep axiomatic analysis of the class of size-approval rules and related classes of approval-ba...
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作者：Deng, Xiaotie; Gafni, Yotam; Lavi, Ron; Lin, Tao; Ling, Hongyi
作者单位：Peking University; Weizmann Institute of Science; University of Bath; Harvard University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We study competition among multiple contest designers in a general model. The goal of each contest designer is to maximize the sum of efforts of the contestants participating in their contest. Assuming symmetric contestants, our main result shows that the optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form an equilibrium in the model with competition. Under a very natural assumption, these contests are domin...
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作者：Jiao, Qian; Kuang, Zhonghong; Liu, Yiran; Yu, Yang
作者单位：Sun Yat Sen University; Renmin University of China; Tsinghua University; China University of Petroleum
摘要：This paper investigates the effort-maximizing design of multi-stage contests with tree-like architectures, focusing on both contest architecture and prize structure. Given the architecture, we show that the whole budget should be assigned to a single match. This match must be the final if the architecture is symmetric. Moreover, the winner-take-all rule proves to be optimal if the contest organizer can jointly design the architecture and prize structure. To determine the optimal contest archit...
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作者：Falvey, Rod; Lane, Tom; Luckraz, Shravan
作者单位：Bond University; Newcastle University - UK; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
摘要：We consider the class of linear voluntary contribution games under the general assumption of heterogeneous endowments. In this context, we generalize the Galbraith Mechanism (GM) and assess its performance relative to a fixed equal sharing allocation in both theory and experiments. Three main empirical results emerge. First, the GM raises average contributions significantly above those under an equal-shares allocation. Second, the GM simultaneously reduces income inequality as it improves effi...
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作者：Ozerturk, Saltuk; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Duke University
摘要：We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, orga...
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作者：Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A natural way of quantifying the amount of information in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.
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作者：Cheung, Paul H. Y.; Ellis, Keaton
作者单位：University of Texas Dallas; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Monash University
摘要：Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through lottery integration. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic ...
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作者：Berman, Ron; Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity that is estimated by analytics algorithms. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly optimal strategies based on estimates from possibly biased analytics algorithms, and (2) the levels of biases form best replies to one another. In equilibrium the firms' algorithms overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically, which causes advertisers to overspend. In price competitions firms also underestimate price el...
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作者：Protopappas, Konstantinos; Rietzke, David
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Lancaster University
摘要：We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-b...
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作者：Jang, Inkee; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Hanyang University; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We examine resource allocation in the context of the capability approach with multi-dimensional human functioning outputs. We aim to provide an egalitarian foundation for human development indices (HDIs) using Parfit's (1997) priority principle, which says that when a person becomes more disabled, ceteris paribus, he should receive more resources. An HDI-egalitarian rule allocates resources in such a way that all individuals attain an equal HDI-index value. Using the priority principle or its ...
