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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the...
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作者：Myatt, David P.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：In a war of attrition a player's perceived strength is the distribution describing beliefs about her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of a game with a deadline the war ends quickly (instantly, as the deadline becomes infinite) with a concession by the (perceived) weaker player. The ranking of strength compares hazard rates in the upper tails of the distributions of beliefs; greater uncertainty about a player tends to give her more strength...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Ozbilen, Seckin
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ozyegin University
摘要：We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into friends and enemies such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends. We sho...
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作者：Kogan, Shimon; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：Reichman University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen; University of Zurich
摘要：Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing-documented for beliefs about individual outcomes-affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, ...
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作者：Kivinen, Steven
作者单位：University of Graz
摘要：We define two belief-free notions of coalitional non-manipulability that rule out coalitions in which some agents are indifferent. Strong robust group strategy-proofness typically yields negative results as it often rules out desirable rules. Semi-strong robust group strategy-proofness permits desirable rules in some environments. The differences between these properties highlight a crucial link between standard truthtelling properties: all members of a successful deviating coalition believe t...
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作者：Tan, Zhibin; Zhigang, Cao; Zou, Zhengxing
作者单位：Beijing Jiaotong University; Beijing Jiaotong University
摘要：We conduct a comparative static analysis for the cores of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games. We introduce a new category of cover, termed as the matrix-exact cover. Our investigation underscores the pivotal role played by the matrix-exact cover, in conjunction with the classical irreducible cost matrix. (i) When edge costs experience a decrease, the core remains invariant as long as the costs of all edges are weakly above their respective matrix-exact covers. (ii) When the costs of certain edge...
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作者：Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Huck, Steffen; Humphreys, Macartan
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Trinity College Dublin; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by bandwagoning with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose ...
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作者：Fischer, Sabine; Grosch, Kerstin
作者单位：Vienna University of Economics & Business
摘要：This study examines the effect of agents' overconfident expectations in their production on their contract breach. Drawing on a reference-dependent framework, we theoretically deduce propositions for compliance to agreements where an agent exhibits overconfidence and loss aversion. We further conduct a lab experiment with a multiple-stage design and find that overconfident agents are more likely to breach the contract than non-overconfident agents. Moreover, overconfident agents breach more of...
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作者：Ashkenazi-Golan, Galit; Karos, Dominik; Lehrer, Ehud
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bielefeld; Tel Aviv University
摘要：A decision maker repeatedly chooses one of a finite set of actions. In each period, the decision maker's payoff depends on a fixed basic payoff of the chosen action and the frequency with the action has been chosen in the past. We analyze optimal strategies associated with three types evaluations of infinite payoffs: discounted present value, the limit inferior, and the limit superior of the partial averages. We show that when the first two are the evaluation schemes (and discount factor is su...
