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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：Georgetown University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper uncovers tight bounds on the number of preferences permissible in identified random utility models. We show that as the number of alternatives in a discrete choice model becomes large, the fraction of preferences admissible in an identified model rapidly tends to zero. We propose a novel sufficient condition ensuring identification, which is strictly weaker than some of those existing in the literature. While this sufficient condition reaches our upper bound, an example demonstrates...
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作者：Hermida-Rivera, Hector
作者单位：Budapest University of Technology & Economics
摘要：In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player, and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rule...
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作者：Luo, Zhaotian; Rozenas, Arturas
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study how the speaker acquires information when they can misrepresent it in communication with the audience. In a binary action setup, we characterize the speaker's optimal information design and the parametric conditions under which the acquired information is disclosed truthfully. When the players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the speaker uses the same information structure as when they could not lie, and they communicate that information truthfully. By contrast, when the play...
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作者：Rostek, Marzena; Yoder, Nathan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching markets and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that transferable utility matching markets can be represented as exchange economies in a way that preserves competitive equilibria and gross complementarity. Unlike canonical representations that preserve substitutability,...
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作者：Morita, Kimiyuki; Muramoto, Akitoshi; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Osaka; Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School
摘要：We study a moral hazard model where multiple agents exhibit interpersonal projection bias, perceiving their peers' production states as similar to their own. Each agent's production state is private information. We characterize optimal contracts with limited liability that induce effort from agents in a production state better than a given cutoff. When the cutoff is sufficiently low (high), relative (resp. joint) performance evaluation is optimal if individual outcomes are contractible despite...
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作者：Heufer, Jan; Shachat, Jason; Xu, Yan
作者单位：Durham University; University of Groningen
摘要：We propose an instrument to measure individuals' social preferences regarding equity and efficiency behind a veil of ignorance while controlling for idiosyncratic risk preferences. We construct a battery of portfolio and wealth distribution choice problems sharing a common budget set. A given bundle induces the same distribution over an individual's wealth in both problems. The portfolio choice solely reflects an individual's risk attitude, providing a benchmark to evaluate whether their wealt...
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作者：Morimoto, Shuhei
作者单位：Tokyo Metropolitan University
摘要：We study a class of matching problems in which monetary transfers are possible. In this paper, we establish a close connection between the core and the existence of desirable rules that satisfy strategy-proofness or one-sided strategy-proofness.In our main result, we show that the optimal core is a unified lower bound of welfare for the existence of rules that satisfy strategy-proofness (or one-sided strategy-proofness), efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy. Applying this result,...
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作者：Arigapudi, Srinivas; Heller, Yuval
作者单位：Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur; Bar Ilan University
摘要：The hawk-dove game admits two types of equilibria: an asymmetric pure equilibrium, in which players in one population play hawk and players in the other population play dove, and a symmetric mixed equilibrium, in which hawks are frequently matched against each other. The existing literature shows that when two populations of agents are randomly matched to play the hawk-dove game, then there is convergence to one of the pure equilibria from almost any initial state. By contrast, we show that pl...
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作者：Liu, Dongri; Lu, Jingfeng
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：In this paper, we provide an implementation of the optimal mechanism of Es & ouml; and Szentes (2007) for their general environment without assuming constant marginal utility (in the first-stage type) for the buyers. Our implementation is carried out through a three-stage handicap auction. In stage 1, each buyer, knowing his first-stage type, is required to select a handicap menu by paying a menu fee. A higher menu fee would lead to a more favorable handicap menu, which charges a lower handica...
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作者：Kambe, Shinsuke
作者单位：Gakushuin University
摘要：We study the effect of the option to exit in finite-horizon, two-person bargaining where players make offers alternatingly and incur fixed costs per period. We show that players use take-it-or- leave-it strategies in the unique equilibrium when there is no discounting. Expecting a low payoff at the next period as a respondent, a proposer would choose to exit after her demand were rejected. This causes her opponent to accept her take-it-or-leave-it offer. This prediction is generically valid ev...
