Maxmin, coalitions and evolution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Newton, Jonathan; Naono, Miharu
• 署名单位: Kyoto University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.002
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: LOCAL STABILITY; Human cognition; intentions; unique

摘要

Maxmin decision making can take place at an individual or a coalitional level. We allow evolution to choose between the two, determining the relative shares of individual and coalitional decision making. We consider factors that favor or disfavor the evolution of coalitionality and apply our framework to social dilemmas, oligopolistic price competition and voting on committees.