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作者：Szwagrzak, Karol Flores-; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：A partnership can yield a return-a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different...
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作者：Degan, Arianna; Li, Yushen; Xie, Huan
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; Jinan University; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We conduct an experiment on a two-player infinitely repeated favor exchange game. In the stage game, each player decides whether to provide a favor to the other player. A favor generates a fixed benefit for the recipient and a cost for the provider, which can be either low or high. We study the situation where this cost is private information and it is efficient to provide a favor only when the cost is low. We address two general questions: 1) To what extent do subjects exchange favors in ways...
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作者：Avalos-Trujillo, Luis
摘要：Upstream reciprocity, known colloquially as pay-it-forward, is reciprocating an act of kindness to an unrelated third party. Negative upstream reciprocity means reciprocating an unkind act to an unrelated third party. The present research proposes an experimental test of upstream reciprocity and contrast between its two forms. Survey questions on trust and gratitude complement the study. Results show evidence of positive upstream reciprocity but against its negative counterpart. Subjects pay f...
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作者：Duggan, John; Forand, Jean Guillaume
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Waterloo
摘要：We study electoral accountability in a dynamic environment with complete information. As our normative benchmark, we take the solution of the dynamic programming problem facing the representative voter as if he chose policy directly. There always exist equilibria in which the congruent politician type, whose policy preferences match those of the voter, is accountable, in the sense that these politicians achieve the idealized benchmark. We demonstrate that challenges to electoral accountability...
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作者：Clyde, Alexander
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：When using data, an analyst often only has access to proxies of the true variables. I propose a framework that models decision makers who naively assume potentially noisy proxy variables are perfect measurements. Due to feedback from choices into data, a notion of equilibrium is required to close the model. I illustrate the concept with applications to policing/crime and market entry. In these applications, we see that very small imperfections in the proxy variable can lead to large distortion...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：This paper examines bargaining between a seller and a buyer with a binary private valuation. The seller offers a price to the buyer in each period. We explicitly construct the complete equilibrium set via an induction argument both for the finite and infinite horizon cases. When the horizon is finite and the probability of a high buyer valuation is large, the seller consistently charges a high price, resulting in trade bursts at the outset and deadline, with constant trade rates in between. We...
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作者：Kamphorst, Jurjen; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This paper studies public concern grounds for high prices of drugs treating rare and debilitating diseases. We offer a theory that explains how drug indivisibility, individual budget constraints, and insurance interact to drive up drug prices, especially for drugs treating rare and severe diseases. For a broad range of drug production costs and income distributions, our model predicts that drug prices are either set at their highest levels covered by insurance or inversely related to the preva...
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作者：Salamat, Ramtin
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：When consumers differ in both their valuations and their likelihood of being well-matched with the product, the seller can benefit from offering trial plans as persuasion instruments to the extent of full surplus extraction. In the presence of picky consumers, those skeptical about product quality but willing to pay a premium if the product meets their standards, offering a menu of trials allows the seller to screen consumers and extract more surplus. If consumers with a higher valuation for a...
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作者：Piazolo, David; Vanberg, Christoph
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：We investigate the effects of alternative voting rules in a three-person, two-period bargaining game with private information. A single proposer is seeking to secure agreement to a proposal under either majority or unanimity rule. Two responders have privately known disagreement payoffs. We characterize Bayesian equilibria in stagewise undominated strategies. Our central result is that responders are 'more expensive' under unanimity rule because they like to be perceived as high types. Ineffic...
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作者：Kandel, Emanuel; Mugerman, Yevgeny; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We investigate subjects' decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose w...
