Propaganda and conflict

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sekeris, Petros G.
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.006
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: RATIONALIST EXPLANATIONS; peace agreements; NATIONALISM; WAR; media

摘要

In this article we explore how propaganda relates to conflict initiation. In the presence of propaganda, if conflict is highly destructive, parties invest in armaments to improve their share of the pie at the negotiation table. If conflict is lowly destructive, peace is never reached and arming is implemented to boost the troops' morale and fighting efficiency. For intermediate destruction levels, the game only admits mixed strategy equilibria where peace and conflict occur probabilistically. A world without propaganda Pareto-dominates one where information can be manipulated. Although lowly destructive conflicts are conducive to war, arming can pacify the situation by giving rise to mixed strategy equilibria where peace is played with strictly positive probability. Countries are shown to have incentives to invest in propaganda despite the fact that war will then occur with strictly positive probability.