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作者：Kishishita, Daiki; Sato, Susumu
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：Watchdog journalism, the idea that independent media outlets monitor people in power, can be undermined when the people in power serve as news sources on which the media rely. By developing a model of media competition with a strategic news source, we show that the presence of a news source creates pro-source biases; the coexistence of neutral watchdogs and biased yes men arises as an outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium. This bias can make the presence of a news source harmful to consumers.
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作者：Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Risma, Eliana Pepa
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism -which is either stable or individually rational and Paretodominates (from the doctors' perspective) a stable mechanism-, is susceptible to manipulation by doctors. Our study focuses on obvious manipulations and identifies stable-dominating mechanisms that prevent them. ...
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作者：Calford, Evan M.; Chakraborty, Anujit
作者单位：Australian National University; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. A minority of subjects (15%) produce precise Bayesian reports, while an additional 59% of subjects produce unbiased reports even when exposed to polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of info...
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作者：Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We consider sampling best response decision protocols with statistical inference in population games. Under these protocols, a revising agent observes the actions of k randomly sampled players in a population, estimates from the sample a probability distribution for the state of the population (using some inference method), and chooses a best response to the estimated distribution. We formulate deterministic approximation dynamics for these protocols. If the inference method is unbiased, stric...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota; Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Communaute d'universites et etablissements de Toulouse (Comue); Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characteri...
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作者：Gao, Lei; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zhewei
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper studies general two-player sequential-move competitions, accommodating a full spectrum of Tullock contest technology and contestants' asymmetry. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preemptive equilibrium to prevail in both strong-lead and weak-lead contests, and discover a characteristic equation to pin down the players' effort ratio (which fully determines their winning chances) and their effort levels when a non-preemptive equilibrium prevails. We find that while ...
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作者：Funai, Naoki
作者单位：Shiga University
摘要：We investigate the convergence properties of an adaptive learning model that overlaps those of stochastic fictitious play learning and experience-weighted attraction learning in normal form games with strict Nash equilibria. In particular, we consider the case in which adaptive players play a game against not only other adaptive players but also committed players, who do not revise their behaviour but follow a fixed (strict Nash equilibrium or corresponding logit quantal response equilibrium) ...
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作者：Mauras, Simon; Pralat, Pawel; Vetta, Adrian
作者单位：Inria; Warsaw School of Economics; McGill University; McGill University
摘要：We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with n doctors and n hospitals, the doctor-proposing deferred-acceptance algorithm gives doctors an expected rank of order logn for their partners and hospitals an expected rank of order n logn for their partners (Pittel, 1989; Wilson, 1972). This situation is reversed in an unbalanced market with n + 1 d...
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作者：Davies, Elwyn; Fafchamps, Marcel
作者单位：The World Bank; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We conduct an interactive online experiment framed as an employment contract. Subjects from the US, India, and Africa are matched within and across countries. Employers make a one-period offer to a worker who can either decline or choose a high or low effort. The offer is restricted to be from a variable set of possible contracts. High effort is always efficient. Some observed choices are well predicted by self-interest, but others are better explained by conditional reciprocity or intrinsic m...
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作者：Holburn, Guy; Raiha, Davin
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); University of Notre Dame
摘要：Organized public demonstrations of voter support for policy issues through rallies and petitions are mechanisms by which interest groups sometimes seek to influence political decision-making. We develop a voter-participation model of an interest group's strategic decision to publicly mobilize supportive voters through either a petition with zero participation cost or through a public rally with positive participation cost. Our model shows that voter mobilization can be influential when elected...
