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作者：Akoz, Kemal Kivanc; Dogan, Emre; Kesten, Onur; Okulicz, Danisz
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); University of Sydney; Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
摘要：Judicial systems around the world widely differ in the degree they allow litigants to exercise their right to legal counsel. When litigants are completely free to choose their lawyers and vice versa, blocking pairs between litigants and lawyers must be eliminated leading to stable matchings. In this context, a negative externality arises: a pairing between a stronger lawyer and a litigant conflicts with the interests of the opposing litigant and his lawyer. We show that the existence of a stab...
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作者：Grigis, Federico; Lozza, Sergio Ortobelli; Vitali, Sebastiano
作者单位：University of Bergamo; University of Bergamo; Charles University Prague
摘要：We propose a model of information transmission and reputation building within a social network that exploits portfolio theory and option structures. The network aims to estimate an unknown parameter through multiple communication rounds. At every communication round, estimates of different agents' abilities are shared, avoiding the repetition of information. These estimates are interpreted as financial assets driven by a compound Poisson process. After every communication round, agents constru...
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作者：Brooksby, Austin; Meyer, Jacob; Rentschler, Lucas; Smith, Vernon; Spofford, Robbie
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Cornell University; Utah System of Higher Education; Utah State University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Smith and Wilson (2018) argue that behavior in the ultimatum game may be due to the typical implementation, in which players are not given the opportunity to opt out of the game. Using insights from Smith (1759), they suggest that making play voluntary would increase rates of equilibrium play. They conducted an augmented ultimatum game where the responder first decides whether to participate, and compare their experimental data to stylized facts from the literature, reporting far higher rates ...
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作者：Kopsacheilis, Orestis; van Dolder, Dennie; Isler, Ozan
作者单位：Technical University of Munich; Technical University of Munich; University of Essex; University of Queensland
摘要：Conditional cooperation is typically studied in experimental settings where the behavior of others is known to subjects. In this study, we examine conditional cooperation under uncertainty. Using a novel experimental design, we exogenously manipulate the likelihood that a subject's partner in a Prisoner's Dilemma will cooperate. Information about the partner's cooperation is either presented descriptively or learned through experiential sampling. We observe a description-experience gap: subjec...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Madmon, Omer; Tennenholtz, Moshe
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Toronto
摘要：We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bounded by a 1 epsilon-fraction of the optimal buyer surplus when the seller has zero valuation for the product. This bound is attained by randomly drawing a seller valuation and applying the segmentation of Bergemann et al. (2015) with respect to the...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：An advisor discloses evidence about an object to a potential buyer, who doesn't know the object's value or the profitability of its sale (the advisor's motives). I characterize optimal disclosure rules that balance two goals: maximizing the overall probability of sale, and steering sales from lower-to higher-profitability objects. I consider the implications of a regulation that forces the advisor to always reveal her motives to the buyer. I show that whether such policies induce the advisor t...
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作者：Bei, Xiaohui; Liu, Shengxin; Lu, Xinhang
作者单位：Nanyang Technological University; Harbin Institute of Technology; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of the resources. In this paper, we propose and study a new model for fair division in which agents have their own subjective divisibility over the goods to be allocated. That is, some agents may find a good to be indivisible and get utilities only if they recei...
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作者：Walker-Jones, David
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：By weakening Shannon's original axioms to allow for attributes of the choice environment to differ in their associated learning costs, this paper provides an axiomatic foundation for Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy, a natural multi-parameter generalization of Shannon Entropy. Sufficient conditions are also provided for a simple dataset that provides a closed-form solution for the Multi-Attribute Shannon Entropy cost function for information by analyzing stochastic choice data produced by a rat...
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作者：Song, Jian; Houser, Daniel
作者单位：Oklahoma City University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; George Mason University
摘要：We extend the war of attrition by studying three-period dynamic contest games. In our game, players can either fight against their opponents at the last period or can fight at any period. Waiting is costly. We focus on the role of waiting costs and show that the value of waiting costs is a key factor in determining the type of equilibrium in such dynamic contests. Specifically, when players are allowed to fight only at the last period, as waiting costs increase, contests end earlier, battles a...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Sternal, Philipp
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Paris School of Economics; University of Zurich
摘要：We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects r...
