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作者：van Damme, Eric; Lang, Xu
作者单位：Tilburg University; Shandong University
摘要：We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, ...
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Baklanov, Artem; Victorova, Elizaveta
作者单位：University of Glasgow; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA); Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：A set of kn indivisible items is to be allocated to n agents; each agent has to get exactly k items, and agents have additive utilities over bundles. Can one find an efficient and approximately fair allocation? In this setting, we introduce new notions of approximate fairness, based on exchange of two single objects, and compare them to the traditional ones based on disregarding one object. Our model and new fairness properties are insensitive to positive affine transformations of utilities, h...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Pkhakadze, Nikoloz
作者单位：Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
摘要：We introduce an equilibrium model of polarizing communication between a sender and two receivers. The sender's payoff is a function of the receivers' beliefs on a binary payoff relevant variable. All agents share a common prior about this variable. But we assume disagreement about a second binary variable, which enters no utility functions. We characterize the joint distribution of receiver posterior beliefs on the payoff relevant variable that can be implemented. An immediate consequence of t...
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作者：Bos, Olivier; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the standard revenue from the respective auction without signaling concern, and a signaling component. The latter is the bidders' ex...
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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Cho and Kreps (1987) proposed a series of criteria for selecting equilibria in signaling games. Their procedure for applying each criterion was to identify all implausible sender types associated with a given off-path message, then look for sequential equilibria assigning probability zero to every implausible type. This paper provides a systematic study of iterated applications of Cho and Kreps (1987) criteria-where in each round, one excludes the additional types that become implausible becau...
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作者：Choon, Thea How
作者单位：Saint Lawrence University
摘要：Do interest groups provide information in ways that systematically bias and polarize candidates? I consider a Downsian model where candidates are uncertain about the median voter's preference. Up to two interest groups, completely biased, observe voter preferences in the extremes and send costless messages to candidates. Starting with one interest group, I show all informative equilibria are asymmetric: the interest group plays favorites by revealing coarse information to one candidate, causin...
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作者：Song, Yangbo
作者单位：The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：I study information aggregation among opinion leaders, who have access to private information, observe their predecessor's move, and care about both taking a correct action and maximizing the measure of followers. Potential followers are uninformed agents who care solely about the truth and choose to agree with either the current opinion leader or their predecessor. I find that the distinct incentive of an opinion leader to disagree with their predecessor, although encouraging every individual...
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作者：Demange, Gabrielle
作者单位：Paris School of Economics
摘要：Communication between individuals often involves two types of dual activities. On social media such as Facebook, for example, users produce content (posts) and pay attention to their friends' posts. These activities are dual as a user is more inclined to produce posts the more friends react to them and is more inclined to dedicate attention to a friend's posts the more numerous these posts are. This paper builds and analyzes a simple game with dual activities and dedicated attention when agent...
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作者：Xiong, Yifan; Li, Guopeng; Lang, Youze
作者单位：Anhui Normal University; Huazhong University of Science & Technology; Fudan University
摘要：This paper investigates how a monopolist strategically acquires information from networked consumers with correlated preferences using discriminatory or uniform pricing schemes. Under uniform pricing, the optimal information acquisition problem can be efficiently solved in polynomial time by iteratively selecting consumers with the highest Katz-Bonacich centrality. By contrast, under discriminatory pricing, the problem is generally NP-hard. However, in typical networks, such as complete bipart...
