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作者：Aziz, Haris; Lederer, Patrick; Lu, Xinhang; Suzuki, Mashbat; Vollen, Jeremy
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to some candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we introduce the maximum payment rule (MP). Under this rule, each voter controls a part of the budget and, in each step, the corresponding voters allocate their entire budget to the candidate approved by the largest number of voters with nonzero budget. We show th...
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作者：Wang, Han
作者单位：Ohio State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of Yoder (2022) from binary states to a general state space. The cost is information of the researcher. When the experiment is observable, we find the optimal contract and show that higher types choose more costly experiments, but not necessarily more Blackwell informative ones. When only the experiment result is observable, the principal can still the same optimal outcome if and o...
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作者：Bils, Peter; Izzo, Federica
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We study strategic policy experimentation by an incumbent politician when voters care about both policy and the candidates' valence. In our model, the voter does not know the location of her ideal policy and learns via experience, in turn, the officeholder uses policymaking to control voter learning. The incumbent thus faces a trade-off between implementing a policy close to his own ideal point, or one that induces the optimal amount of voter learning to win reelection. In equilibrium, how the...
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作者：Bizzarri, Matteo; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Siena; Bocconi University
摘要：We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in homophily when homophily is small, and decreasing when high), and on the cumulative number of infections generated by a deviation from the steady state (that, instead, is decreasing in homophily when homophily is small, and increasing when high). If immunization rat...
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作者：Hsu, Chin-Chia; Ajorlou, Amir; Jadbabaie, Ali
摘要：In this paper, we develop a game-theoretic model of sharing decisions among users of a Twitter-like social network. Agents have a subjective prior on an unobservable real-valued state, representing their beliefs on a topic that is subject to a binary action. Agents cast their binary action, matching the sign of the state. Before the action stage, a small fraction of agents receive a piece of news which impacts their beliefs. Those who receive the news update their belief and make a decision as...
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作者：Abe, Takaaki
作者单位：Kyushu University
摘要：We consider a committee that consists of n members with one person one vote approving a proposal if the number of affirmative votes from the members reaches threshold k. Which threshold k between 1 and n is stable for the committee? We suppose that if a new threshold k' proposed by some committee members obtains k or more affirmative votes, then the new threshold replaces the current one. Assuming that each member has preferences for the set of possible thresholds, we analyze which threshold m...
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作者：Goel, Sumit
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi
摘要：We study the design of effort-maximizing grading schemes between agents with private abilities. Assuming agents derive value from the information their grade reveals about their ability, we find that more informative grading schemes induce more competitive contests, i.e., contests with greater inequality across prizes. In the contest framework, we investigate the effect of manipulating individual prizes and increasing competition on expected effort, identifying conditions on ability distributi...
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作者：Asulin, Yamit; Heller, Yuval; Munichor, Nira; Zultan, Ro'i
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Bar Ilan University
摘要：People behave more pro-socially when observed by others. We develop a theoretical model incorporating social distance between agent and observer and test its predictions in a field experiment with 670 high-school students. The experiment manipulated the observer's identity (friend, acquaintance, or none) and capped personal rewards. Observability increased effort, and personal rewards enhanced above-threshold effort when effort was observable. Among young adolescents, these effects were strong...
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作者：Li, King King; Suzuki, Toru
作者单位：Hang Seng University of Hong Kong; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：This paper investigates the role of uninformed agents in information aggregation. A group of agents, who may or may not have private information about the state, communicate through a specific communication format and vote to make the correct decision-one that matches an unobservable state-based on majority rule. We analyzed efficient equilibria under simultaneous and sequential communication formats and tested these predictions in the laboratory. When all agents were informed, information was...
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作者：Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We study sequential processes where agents create value through costly and uncertain investments, with success triggering further investment decisions by others. Our paper focuses on designing optimal allocation rules that distribute the total value generated among agents, balancing the recognition of past contributions with incentives for future investments. We prove the existence of equilibrium in the game induced by any such rule and identify a unique investment profile that maximizes the o...
