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作者：Chan, Keith Jin Deng
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Gale and Sabourian (2006) argue that Markov strategies in dynamic matching and bargaining games accommodate non-competitive behavior: with heterogeneous players, outcomes may be inefficient. In this paper, I show that their corroborating example with four players does not comprise a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). In fact, I show that all MPEs must be efficient in their setting with only four players. Nevertheless, I construct a continuum of inefficient equilibria in a balanced market with s...
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作者：Hu, Xiaoxiao; Lei, Haoran
作者单位：Ningbo University; Hunan University
摘要：We analyze the optimal delegation problem between a principal and an agent, assuming that the latter has state-independent preferences. We demonstrate that if the principal is more risk-averse than the agent toward non-status quo options, an optimal mechanism is a veto mechanism. In a veto mechanism, the principal uses veto (i.e., maintaining the status quo) to balance the agent's incentives and does not randomize among non-status quo options. We characterize the optimal veto mechanism in a on...
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作者：Neugebauer, Tibor; Sadrieh, Abdolkarim; Selten, Reinhard
作者单位：University of Luxembourg; Otto von Guericke University; University of Bonn
摘要：The paper experimentally examines the predictive power of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium concept in the three-player Game of Selten's Horse. At first sight, our data show little support of the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium and rather favor the imperfect equilibrium. We introduce deterministic impulse response trajectories that converge on the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. The impulse response trajectories are remarkably close - closer than the trajectories from a reinforceme...
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作者：Kishishita, Daiki; Sato, Susumu
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Hitotsubashi University
摘要：Watchdog journalism, the idea that independent media outlets monitor people in power, can be undermined when the people in power serve as news sources on which the media rely. By developing a model of media competition with a strategic news source, we show that the presence of a news source creates pro-source biases; the coexistence of neutral watchdogs and biased yes men arises as an outcome of mixed strategy equilibrium. This bias can make the presence of a news source harmful to consumers.
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作者：Arribillaga, R. Pablo; Risma, Eliana Pepa
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Universidad Nacional de San Luis
摘要：This paper explores many-to-one matching models, both with and without contracts, where doctors' preferences are private and hospitals' preferences are public and substitutable. It is known that any stable-dominating mechanism -which is either stable or individually rational and Paretodominates (from the doctors' perspective) a stable mechanism-, is susceptible to manipulation by doctors. Our study focuses on obvious manipulations and identifies stable-dominating mechanisms that prevent them. ...
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作者：Calford, Evan M.; Chakraborty, Anujit
作者单位：Australian National University; University of California System; University of California Davis
摘要：We study the value of and the demand for instrumentally-valuable information in a simple decision environment where signals are transparently polarized. We find that in both information aggregation and acquisition, subjects use sophisticated heuristics to counter the polarization in signals. A minority of subjects (15%) produce precise Bayesian reports, while an additional 59% of subjects produce unbiased reports even when exposed to polarized signals. Subjects placed in a market place of info...
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作者：Ichihashi, Shota; Smolin, Alex
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characteri...
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作者：Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We consider sampling best response decision protocols with statistical inference in population games. Under these protocols, a revising agent observes the actions of k randomly sampled players in a population, estimates from the sample a probability distribution for the state of the population (using some inference method), and chooses a best response to the estimated distribution. We formulate deterministic approximation dynamics for these protocols. If the inference method is unbiased, stric...
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作者：Gao, Lei; Lu, Jingfeng; Wang, Zhewei
作者单位：Shandong University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper studies general two-player sequential-move competitions, accommodating a full spectrum of Tullock contest technology and contestants' asymmetry. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a preemptive equilibrium to prevail in both strong-lead and weak-lead contests, and discover a characteristic equation to pin down the players' effort ratio (which fully determines their winning chances) and their effort levels when a non-preemptive equilibrium prevails. We find that while ...
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作者：Chen, Ying; Lane, Tom; Mcdonald, Stuart
作者单位：University of Nottingham Ningbo China; Newcastle University - UK
摘要：We experimentally explore public good production levels and the endogenous formation of network structures to facilitate output sharing among agents with heterogeneous production costs and consumption valuations. Results corroborate the key theoretical insights of Kinateder and Merlino (2017) characterizing how agents form core-periphery networks. However, subjects often produce more and form denser networks than predicted, which sometimes reduces efficiency. There is some tendency for behavio...
