Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Serrano, R; Shimomura, K
署名单位：
Brown University; University of Osaka
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.2467
发表日期：
1998
页码：
286-307
关键词：
摘要：
We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the Nash product of their utilities, subject to efficiency, is critical. The intersection of the Nash set and the core is also characterized with the same axioms for the class of games where the core is non-empty. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C78. (C) 1998 Academic Press.