Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Cremer, J; Khalil, F; Rochet, JC
署名单位：
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Universitaire de France; University of Southampton; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1998.2415
发表日期：
1998
页码：
163-200
关键词：
摘要：
In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: He will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. We identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a maybe informed agent. (C) 1998 Academic Press.