Subgame perfect equilibria in stage games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manelli, AM
• 署名单位: Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2812
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 480-484
• 关键词: Existence; Subgame perfect equilibrium; infinite stage games; cheap talk; correlation

摘要

It is well known that a stage game with infinite choice-sets, unless it contains a public coordination-de ice in each stage, may have no subgame perfect equilibria. We show that if a game with public coordination-de ices has a subgame perfect equilibrium in which two players in each stage use non-atomic strategies. then the game without coordination devices also has a subgame perfect equilibrium. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.