On learning to cooperate

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anthonisen, N
• 署名单位: Mount Allison University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2918
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 253-287
• 关键词: Learning; experimentation; finitely-repeated prisoner's dilemma

摘要

This paper shows that experimentation can have the effect of inducing outcomes that are far from Nash in a learning model similar to that studied by D. Fudenberg and D. K. Levine (1993, Econometrica 61, 547-573). The game under consideration is a version of a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma, and the average length of players' lifetimes is arbitrarily large, but fixed. If the number of stages in the prisoner's dilemma is sufficiently large, then experimentation induces cooperation within the society on an arbitrarily large scale, even though the beliefs of almost all players are eventually within an arbitrary eta > 0 of being correct at all of the information sets in the game. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).