Simple strategy-proof approximately Walrasian mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kovalenkov, A
• 署名单位: University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2000.2788
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 475-487
• 关键词: Walrasian mechanism; large economics; implementation; strategy-proofness; limit theorem

摘要

This note provides an indirect analysis of the incentive properties of the Walrasian mechanism. It presents mechanisms under which truth-telling is a dominant strategy in Finite exchange economics (in contrast to the Walrasian mechanism) and whose outcomes (generically) approximate Walrasian ones for large economics. These mechanisms provide new insights on the well-know trade-off between efficiency and incentive compatibility in finite economics. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).