Strategic manipulation in voting games when lotteries and ties are permitted

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Benoît, JP
• 署名单位: New York University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2794
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 421-436
• 关键词: Social choice; strategyproofness; lotteries; Gibbard; Satterthwaite; TIES

摘要

A Gibbard-Satterthwaite type theorem is established for random decision rules and rules that permit ties. The rules use full information on how individuals rank lotteries and sets of outcomes. The theorem allows restrictions on the domain of rankings. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science.