On sustaining cooperation without public observations
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Compte, O
署名单位：
Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.2001.2867
发表日期：
2002
页码：
106-150
关键词：
摘要：
This paper examines a dynamic game in which each player only observes a private and imperfect signal on the actions played. Our main result is that in a repeated prisoner's dilemma where defections are irreversible (at least for a long enough period of time), patient enough players may achieve almost efficient outcomes. Dealing with models of imperfect private monitoring is difficult because (i) continuation games are games or incomplete information, hence they do not have the same structure as the original game. In particular, continuation equilibria are correlated equilibria. (ii) Players are typically uncertain about their opponents' past observations and actions, and they use their entire own private history to learn about these actions. As a result equilibrium strategies are in general nontrivial and increasingly complex functions of past observations. We bypass these difficulties by looking at correlated equilibria of the original game and rind correlated equilibria in which the decision problem faced by each player remains the same over time. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.