Payoffs in nondifferentiable perfectly competitive TU economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haimanko, O
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2826
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 17-39
• 关键词: Market games; TU economics; core selection; Mertens value

摘要

We show that a single-valued solution of nonatomic finite-type market games (or perfectly competitive TU economies underling them) is uniquely determined as the Mertens value by four plausible value-related axioms. Since the Mertens value is always in the core of an economy, this result provides an axiomatization of a core-selection (or, alternatively, a competitive payoff selection). (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).