Moral hazard and private monitoring

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bhaskar, V; van Damme, E
• 署名单位: University of Essex
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2861
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 16-39
• 关键词: Repeated games; private monitoring; Mixed strategies

摘要

We clarify the role of mixed strategies and public randomization (sunspots) in sustaining near-efficient outcomes in repeated games with private monitoring. We study a finitely repeated game, where the stage game has multiple equilibria and show that mixed strategies can support partial cooperation, but cannot approximate full cooperation even if monitoring is almost perfect. Efficiency requires extensive form correlation. where strategies can condition upon a sunspot at the end of each period. For any finite number of repetitions, we approximate the best equilibrium payoff under perfect monitoring, assuming that monitoring is sufficiently accurate and sunspots are available. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science.