Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goeree, JK; Holt, CA; Palfrey, TR
• 署名单位: University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2914
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 247-272
• 关键词: Auctions; quantal response; experiments; risk aversion

摘要

This paper applies the quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model to study overbidding in private-values auctions. Experimental evidence shows that the prevalence of overbidding depends on the cost of overbidding relative to underbidding, as predicted theoretically. We use QRE as an error structure to estimate parameters of several competing models of overbidding. A QRE model based on risk averse bidders closely tracks the exact distribution of bids. The estimated parameters are significant and consistent across treatments. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).