A backward induction experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Binmore, K; McCarthy, J; Ponti, G; Samuelson, L; Shaked, A
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2910
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 48-88
• 关键词: Bargaining; experiments; backward induction; subgame-perfect equilibrium; interdependent preferences

摘要

This paper reports experiments with one-stage and two-stage alternating-offers bargaining games. Payoff-interdependent preferences have been suggested as an explanation for experimental results that are commonly inconsistent with players' maximizing their monetary payoffs and performing backward induction calculations. We examine whether, given payoff-interdependent preferences, players respect backward induction. To do this, we break backward induction into its components, subgame consistency and truncation consistency. We examine each by comparing the outcomes of two-stage bargaining games with one-stage games with varying rejection payoffs. We find and characterize systematic violations of both subgame and truncation consistency. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).