Sharing the surplus:: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Macho-Stadler, Ines; Perez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.001
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 339-356
• 关键词: externalities; sharing the surplus; Shapley value

摘要

Economic activities, both on the macro and micro level, often entail wide-spread externalities. This in turn leads to disputes regarding the compensation levels to the various parties affected. We propose a method of deciding upon the distribution of the gains (costs) of cooperation in the presence of externalities when forming the grand coalition is efficient. We show that any sharing rule satisfying efficiency, linearity, dummy player and a strong symmetry axioms can be obtained through an average game. Adding an additional axiom, we identify one unique rule satisfying these properties. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.