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作者：Citanna, Alessandro; Siconolfi, Paolo
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Columbia University
摘要：In stochastic OLG exchange economies, we show that short-memory equilibria-the natural extension from deterministic economies of steady states, low-order cycles, or finite state-space stationary sunspots equilibria-fail to exist generically in utilities. As a result, even with independent and identically distributed exogenous shocks there is serial correlation in endogenous economic variables in equilibrium. This arises even if utilities are time-separable, some goods inferior, and there are n...
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作者：Kartik, Navin; Ottaviani, Marco; Squintani, Francesco
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of London; London Business School; University of London; University College London
摘要：This paper studies a model of strategic communication by an informed and upwardly biased sender to one or more receivers. Applications include situations in which (i) it is costly for the sender to misrepresent information, due to legal, technological, or moral constraints, or (ii) receivers may be credulous and blindly believe the sender's recommendation. In contrast to the predictions obtained in the benchmark cheap talk model, our model admits a fully separating equilibrium, provided that t...
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作者：Monteiro, Paulo Klinger; Page, Frank H., Jr.
作者单位：University of Alabama System; University of Alabama Tuscaloosa
摘要：We introduce a condition, uniform payoff security, for games with compact Hausdorff strategy spaces and payoffs bounded and measurable in players' strategies. We show that if any such compact game G is uniformly payoff secure, then its mixed extension (G) over bar is payoff secure. We also establish that if a uniformly payoff secure compact game G has a mixed extension (G) over bar with reciprocally upper semicontinuous payoffs, then G has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. We provide sev...
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作者：Marshall, Robert C.; Marx, Leslie M.
作者单位：Duke University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We analyze bidder collusion at first-price and second-price auctions. Our focus is on less than all-inclusive cartels and collusive mechanisms that do not rely on auction outcomes. We show that cartels that cannot control the bids of their members can eliminate all ring competition at second-price auctions, but not at first-price auctions. At first-price auctions, when the cartel cannot control members' bids, cartel behavior involves multiple cartel bids. Cartels that can control bids of their...
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作者：Vartiainen, Hannu
摘要：Moore and Repullo [Subgame perfect implementation, Econometrica 56 (1988) 1191-1220], and Abreu and Sen [Subgame perfect implementation: a necessary and almost sufficient condition, J. Econ. Theory 50 (1990) 285-299] introduce distinct necessary and sufficient conditions for SPE implementation, when the number of players is at least three. This paper closes the gap between the conditions-a complete characterization of the SPE implementable choice rules is provided. The characterization consist...
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作者：de Vries, Sven; Schummer, James; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Northwestern University; Technical University of Munich
摘要：We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primal-dual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficient-allocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidders to report their preferred bundles in each round. A bidder's prices are increased when he belongs to a minimally undersupplied set of bidders. This concept generalizes the notion of overdemanded sets of objects introduced by Demange, Gale, and Sot...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
摘要：Consider the problem of aggregating a profile of interpersonally comparable utilities into a social utility. We require that the units of measurement of utility used for agents is the same as the units of measurement for society (ordinal covariance) and a mild Pareto condition (monotonicity). We provide several representations of such social aggregation operators: a canonical representation, a Choquet expectation representation, a minimax representation, and a quantile representation (with res...
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作者：Han, Seungjin
作者单位：McMaster University
摘要：This paper formulates the notion of a strongly robust equilibrium relative to a set of mechanisms specified in any competing-mechanism game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple agents. It shows that when agents' efforts are contractible, any strongly robust pure-strategy equilibrium relative to single-incentive contracts persists, regardless of the continuation equilibrium that agents play upon any principal's deviation to any complex mechanism. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. ...
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作者：McAdams, David
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Except for well-studied special cases in which bidders have single-unit demand or bidders are risk-neutral with independent private values, equilibria of uniform-price auctions with private values need not possess familiar monotonicity properties. In particular, equilibria in weakly undominated strategies may exist in which some bidders bid strictly less on some units when they have strictly higher values for every unit. (c) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Peters, Michael
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：Two sides of a finite marriage market engage in costly investment and are then matched assortatively. The purpose of the investment is solely to improve the quality of the match that the trader can attain in the second stage. The paper studies the limits of equilibrium of these finite matching games as the number of traders gets large. It is shown that mixed Nash equilibria in the finite games converge to degenerate pure strategy equilibria in the limit in which both sides of the market invest...
