Core tatonnement

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manea, Mihai
• 署名单位: Harvard University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.12.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 331-349
• 关键词: algorithms for cooperative solution concepts; core stability; core tatonnement; reallocation processes for coalitional games; tatonnement processes

摘要

Two discrete time tatonnement processes-one featuring successive tatonnement, the other featuring simultaneous tatonnernent-for the core of coalitional games with transferable utility are introduced. For totally balanced games, the successive core tatonnement process corresponds to the standard simultaneous price tatonnement process of competitive equilibrium theory via the Shapley-Shubik (market game-direct market) correspondence. The simultaneous core tatonnement process is based entirely on the intuition behind the definition of the core for games with transferable utility, and it does not correspond to any evident competitive equilibrium tatonnement process. Both processes are proven to be globally stable. The two processes offer easily implementable algorithms for approximately computing core points. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.