On p-rationalizability and approximate common certainty of rationality

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hu, Tai-Wei
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.002
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 379-391
• 关键词: rationalizable sets; Common p-belief; common knowledge

摘要

This paper shows that common P-belief of rationality implies p-rationalizability for games with compact strategy sets. We also establish the Bayesian foundation for the perfect p-rationalizability for finite games. The p-rationalizability is then used to analyze the robustness of rationalizable sets. For any game with compact strategy sets, we show that the rationalizable set is robust, i.e., the strategies characterized by common p-belief of rationality are close to the rationalizable set when p -> 1. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.