Null or nullifying players: The difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: van den Brink, Rene
• 署名单位: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.09.008
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 767-775
• 关键词: Shapley value; equal division solution; equal surplus division solution; null player; nullifying player

摘要

A famous solution for cooperative tran, ferable utility gatnes is the Shapley value. Most axiomatic characterizations of this value use some axiom related to null players, i.e. players who contribute zero to any coalition. We show that replacing null players with nullifying players characterizes the equal division solution distributing the worth of the 'grand coalition' equally among all players. A player is nullibing if every coalition containing this player earns zero worth. Using invariance we provide similar characterizations of the equal surplus division solution assigning to every player its own worth, and distributing the remaining surplus equally among all players. (C) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.