Optimal search auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cremer, Jacques; Spiegel, Yossi; Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng
• 署名单位: Northwestern University; Universite de Toulouse; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2006.03.003
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 226-248
• 关键词: Optimal auction; participation cost; search procedure

摘要

We study the design of profit maximizing single unit auctions under the assumption that the seller needs to incur costs to contact prospective bidders and inform them about the auction. With independent bidders' types and possibly interdependent valuations, the seller's problem can be reduced to a search problem in which the surplus is measured in terms of virtual utilities minus search costs. Compared to the socially efficient mechanism, the optimal mechanism features fewer participants, longer search conditional on the same set of participants, and inefficient sequence of entry. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.