Dynamic signaling and market breakdown

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kremer, Ilan; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
• 署名单位: Stanford University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.004
• 发表日期: 2007
• 页码: 58-82
• 关键词: Dynamic; signaling; screening; bargaining

摘要

We consider the effects a public revelation of information (e.g. rating, grade) has on trading in a dynamic signaling model. Competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade. Delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration. The external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium. More interestingly, we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices. If signals are noisy, no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information. If signals are fully revealing, then trade occurs even close to revelation, however, transaction prices are discontinuous. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.