-
作者：Jindani, Sam
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Can cooperation be sustained in large populations? This paper studies settings in which a large group of players is rematched at random each period. In such settings cooperation cannot be sustained by an equilibrium unless deviators are sanctioned by third parties. This is known as the problem of community enforcement. Previous analyses have relied on strong assumptions about what information players have access to. This paper shows that when players are matched with multiple partners in each ...
-
作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
作者单位：Maastricht University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We introduce the new notion of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set to study stable matchings under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. For the special case where all players are myopic, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all players are farsighted, we provide the characterization of pairwise myopic-farsighted stable sets: a set of matchings is a pairwise myopic farsighted stable set if and only if it is a singleton consisting of a core ...
-
作者：Wang, Tianxi; Wright, Greg C.
作者单位：University of Essex; University of California System; University of California Merced
摘要：A key feature of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) is that they increase the size of the market - or the scale of operation - for workers in some occupations. We model the scale of operation as the limit up to which the production technology displays increasing returns to scale. We then explore the implications of this feature of ICT for the income distribution within affected occupations, as well as for individuals' occupational choices. Within occupations, an increase in the s...
-
作者：Utgoff, Naomi
作者单位：United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
摘要：This paper provides a unifying framework for matching markets with incomplete information in which the positive assortative match is always efficient. I construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-like mechanism which implements the positive assortative match as an ex post Nash equilibrium. It achieves this result by using a payment rule that distinguishes between an agent deprived of any match and an agent who merely receives a reduced match value. The constructed mechanism recognizes only opportunity ...
-
作者：Cabral, Luis; Gilbukh, Sonia
作者单位：New York University; City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY)
摘要：We develop a dynamic pricing model motivated by observed patterns in business-to-business (and some business-to-customer) transactions. Seller costs are perfectly correlated and evolve according to a Markov process. In every period, each buyer observes (for free) the price set by their current supplier, but not the other sellers' prices or the sellers' (common) cost level. By paying a cost s the buyer becomes active and benefits from (Bertrand) competition among sellers. We show that there exi...
-
作者：Galperti, Simone; Trevino, Isabel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：People seek to learn about world events, but often also what others know about those events-for instance, to coordinate their actions. News sources rely on monetizing people's attention to thrive in the market. We find that competition for attention leads to a homogeneous supply of information: News sources are equally accurate in reporting events and equally clear in conveying their reports. This occurs even though people would demand different accuracies and clarities. The type of supplied s...
-
作者：Heinsalu, Sander
作者单位：Australian National University
摘要：The main result of Lagziel and Lehrer (2019) (LL) A bias in screening is generalized, and also derived using Chambers and Healy (2011) (CH) Reversals of signal-posterior monotonicity for any bounded prior. LL show that the conditional expectation of an unobserved variable of interest, given that a noisy signal of it exceeds a cutoff, may decrease in the cutoff. CH prove that the distribution of a variable given a lower signal may first order stochastically dominate the distribution given a hig...
-
作者：Terstiege, Stefan; Wasser, Cedric
作者单位：Maastricht University; University of Basel
摘要：Motivated by the regulation of product information, we study buyer-optimal information structures under monopoly pricing. The information structure determines the buyer's private learning of his valuation and in consequence the price the seller charges. By adding information, the seller may change the learning in her favor. We introduce the constraint that the information structure be extensionproof: the seller must have no incentive to add information. A two-parameter class of information str...
-
作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Rudiger, Jesper; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); Universidad Carlos III de Madrid; BI Norwegian Business School
摘要：Certifiers often base their decisions on a mixture of information, some of which is voluntarily disclosed by applicants, and some of which they acquire by way of tests or otherwise. We study the interplay between the information acquisition of certifiers and the information disclosure of applicants. We show that the inability of a certifier to commit to the amount of information to be acquired can result in a reduction of information disclosed. Among other consequences, given the choice betwee...
-
作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Liu, Ce; Rehbeck, John
作者单位：Georgetown University; Michigan State University; University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We provide revealed preference characterizations for choices made under various forms of costly information acquisition. We examine nonseparable, multiplicative, and constrained costly information acquisition. In particular, this allows the possibility of unknown time delay for acquiring information. The techniques we use parallel the duality properties in the standard consumer problem. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
