Community enforcement using modal actions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jindani, Sam
• 署名单位: University of Oxford
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104972
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Repeated games; Random matching; Community enforcement; information transmission; Modal actions

摘要

Can cooperation be sustained in large populations? This paper studies settings in which a large group of players is rematched at random each period. In such settings cooperation cannot be sustained by an equilibrium unless deviators are sanctioned by third parties. This is known as the problem of community enforcement. Previous analyses have relied on strong assumptions about what information players have access to. This paper shows that when players are matched with multiple partners in each period, it is possible to limit the amount of information required to support cooperative outcomes. The results hold for general games and for equilibria that are robust to noise. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.