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作者：Stachurski, John; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Australian National University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This note corrects the proof of Proposition 5 in Stachurski and Toda (2019), which shows that the consumption function has an explicit linear lower bound and is used to prove their main result that wealth inherits the tail behavior of income in Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari models. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Kim, Jinwoo; Koh, Youngwoo
作者单位：Seoul National University (SNU); Seoul National University (SNU); Hanyang University
摘要：We study a simple auction model with interdependent values in which there are two bidders each of whom observes a binary signal and can learn rival's information at a cost, whereafter they compete in the first-price or second-price auction. We characterize a unique symmetric equilibrium strategy-learning and bidding strategies-for the two auction formats. In the first-price auction, bidders with high signal learn rival's information with higher probability than those with low signal do. In the...
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作者：Denderski, Piotr; Stoltenberg, Christian A.
作者单位：University of Leicester; Polish Academy of Sciences; Institute of Economics of the Polish Academy of Sciences; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：In this paper, we revisit the conventional view on efficient risk sharing that advance information on future shocks is detrimental to welfare. In our model, risk-averse agents receive private and public signals on future income realizations and engage in insurance contracts with limited enforceability. Consistent with the conventional view, better private and public signals are detrimental to welfare when only one type of signal is informative. Our main novel result applies when both signals a...
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作者：Pablo Arribillaga, R.; Masso, Jordi; Neme, Alejandro
作者单位：Universidad Nacional de San Luis; Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas y Tecnicas (CONICET); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
摘要：We characterize the set of all obviously strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on the domain of single-peaked preferences. Since obvious strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness, and the set of strategy-proof and onto social choice functions on this domain coincides with the class of generalized median voter schemes, we focus on this class. We identify a condition on generalized median voter schemes for which the following characterization holds. A generalized median voter schem...
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作者：Dur, Umut; Pathak, Parag A.; Sonmez, Tayfun
作者单位：North Carolina State University; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); National Bureau of Economic Research; Boston College
摘要：Prohibitions on using race in affirmative action have spurred a number of admissions systems to adopt race-neutral alternatives that encourage diversity without appearing to explicitly advantage any particular group. The new affirmative action system for Chicago's exam schools reserves seats for students based on their neighborhood and leaves the rest to be assigned via merit. Neighborhoods are divided into four tiers based on an index of socioeconomic disadvantage. At each school, an equal fr...
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作者：Li, Jian; Zhou, Junjie
作者单位：Iowa State University; National University of Singapore
摘要：This paper examines the robustness of Lehmann's ranking of experiments (Lehmann, 1988) for decision-makers who are uncertainty averse a la Cerreia-Vioglio et al. (2011). We show that, assuming commitment, for all uncertainty-averse indices satisfying some mild assumptions, Lehmann's informativeness ranking is equivalent to the induced uncertainty-averse value ranking of experiments for all agents with single-crossing vNM utility indices (Theorem 1). Moreover, Lehmann's ranking can also be dete...
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作者：Bergemann, Dirk; Castro, Francisco; Weintraub, Gabriel Y.
作者单位：Yale University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Stanford University
摘要：We study the classic sequential screening problem in the presence of ex post participation constraints. We establish necessary and sufficient conditions that determine when the optimal selling mechanism is either static or sequential. In the static contract, the buyers are not screened with respect to their interim type and the object is sold at a posted price. In the sequential contract, the buyers are screened with respect to their interim type and a menu of quantities is offered. We complet...
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作者：Bobkova, Nina
作者单位：Rice University
摘要：I solve a first-price auction for two bidders with asymmetric budget distributions and known valuations for one object. I show that in any equilibrium, the expected utilities and bid distributions of both bidders are unique. If budgets are sufficiently low, the bidders will bid their entire budget in any equilibrium. For sufficiently high budgets, mass points in the equilibrium strategies arise. A less restrictive budget distribution could make both bidders strictly worse off. If the budget di...
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作者：Gul, Faruk; Pesendorfer, Wolfgang
作者单位：Princeton University
摘要：We define a binary relation (qualitative uncertainty assessment) that describes the shared likelihood assessments of decision makers with diverse ambiguity attitudes. Ambiguity renders this binary relation incomplete. Our axioms yield a representation according to which A is more likely than B if and only if a capacity, called uncertainty measure, assigns a higher value to A than to B and a higher value to B-complement than to A-complement. Agents combine this uncertainty perception with their...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Shi, Xianwen
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; University of Toronto
摘要：We study issue-by-issue voting by majority and incentive compatibility in multidimensional frameworks where privately informed agents have preferences induced by general norms and where dimensions are endogenously chosen. We uncover the deep connections between dominant strategy incentive compatibility (DIC) on the one hand, and several geometric/functional analytic concepts on the other. Our main results are: 1) Marginal medians are DIC if and only if they are calculated with respect to coord...
