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作者：Troyan, Peter; Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：University of Virginia; North Carolina State University
摘要：A mechanism is strategy-proof if agents can never profitably manipulate it, in any state of the world; however, not all non-strategy-proof mechanisms are equally easy to manipulate - some are more obviously manipulable than others. We propose a formal definition of an obvious manipulation in which agents compare worst cases to worst cases and best cases to best cases. We show that a profitable manipulation is obvious if and only if it can be identified as profitable by a cognitively limited ag...
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作者：Joshi, Sumit; Mahmud, Ahmed Saber; Sarangi, Sudipta
作者单位：George Washington University; Johns Hopkins University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; George Washington University; Johns Hopkins University; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：This paper examines the formation of one network G when connections in a second network H are inherited under two scenarios: (i) H is asymmetric allowing for a wide range of networks called nested split graphs, and (ii) H is a connected regular graph. The bulk of our paper assumes that both G and H are interdependent because the respective actions in each are (weak) strategic complements. This complementarity creates a silver spoon effect whereby those who inherit high Katz-Bonacich centrality...
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作者：Chander, Parkash; Wooders, Myrna
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh; Vanderbilt University
摘要：We propose a new solution concept for games in extensive form that incorporates both cooperation and subgame perfection. From its definition and properties, the new solution concept, named the subgame-perfect core, is a refinement of the core of an extensive game in the same sense as the set of subgame-perfect Nash equilibria is a refinement of the set of Nash equilibria. To further characterize the subgame-perfect core, we show that each subgame-perfect core payoff vector can be implemented a...
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作者：Kohlhas, Alexandre N.
摘要：The past two decades have seen a considerable increase in the amount of public information provided by policymakers. Are such disclosures desirable? Or is it instead preferable to use such information to condition a policy instrument, such a tax or an interest rate? This paper studies the relative merits of each means to use a policymaker's information in a flexible class of economies that feature dispersed information, and payoff and learning externalities. I provide conditions for when the e...
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作者：Loertscher, Simon; Marx, Leslie M.
作者单位：University of Melbourne; Duke University
摘要：Clock auctions have a number of properties that make them attractive for practical purposes. They are weakly group strategy-proof, make bidding truthfully an obviously dominant strategy, and preserve trading agents' privacy. However, optimal reserve prices and stopping rules depend on the details of underlying distributions, and so clock auctions have proved challenging to implement in a prior-free, asymptotically optimal way. In this paper, we develop a prior-free clock auction that is asympt...
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作者：Ma, Qingyin; Stachurski, John; Toda, Alexis Akira
作者单位：Capital University of Economics & Business; Australian National University; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：We analyze the household savings problem in a general setting where returns on assets, non-financial income and impatience are all state dependent and fluctuate over time. All three processes can be serially correlated and mutually dependent. Rewards can be bounded or unbounded, and wealth can be arbitrarily large. Extending classic results from an earlier literature, we determine conditions under which (a) solutions exist, are unique and are globally computable, (b) the resulting wealth dynam...
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作者：Huang, Shiyang; Qiu, Zhigang; Yang, Liyan
作者单位：University of Hong Kong; Renmin University of China; Renmin University of China; University of Toronto; Johns Hopkins University; Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; Shanghai Institute of International Finance & Economics
摘要：We study the effects of institutionalization on fund manager compensation and asset prices. Institutionalization raises the performance-sensitive component of the equilibrium contract, which makes institutional investors effectively more risk averse. Institutionalization affects market outcomes through two opposing effects. The direct effect is to bring in more informed capital, and the indirect effect is to make each institutional investor trade less aggressively on information through affect...
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作者：Al-Najjar, Nabil, I; Pomatto, Luciano
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In the evaluation of public policies, a crucial distinction is between plans that involve purely idiosyncratic risk and those that generate correlated, or aggregate, risk. While natural, this distinction is not captured by standard utilitarian aggregators. In this paper we revisit Harsanyi's (1955) celebrated theory of preferences aggregation and develop a parsimonious generalization of utilitarianism. The theory we propose captures sensitivity to aggregate risk in large populations and can be...
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作者：Flemming, Jean
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve System Board of Governors
摘要：An evolving outside option is introduced into a stochastic directed search model with skill loss during non-employment. Using multi-spell data from the SIPP, I show that average reemployment wages are only mildly sensitive to unemployment duration while the job finding probability is highly sensitive to duration, with evidence of true duration dependence in both variables. Though untargeted, the model produces a quantitatively accurate decline in the job finding probability and starting wage, ...
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作者：Dewan, Ambuj; Neligh, Nathaniel
作者单位：New York University; Chapman University System; Chapman University
摘要：Models of costly information acquisition have grown in popularity in economics. However, little is known about what form information costs take in reality. We show that under mild assumptions on costs, including continuity and convexity, gross payoffs to decision makers are non-decreasing and continuous in potential rewards. We conduct experiments involving simple perceptual tasks with fine-grained variation in the level of potential rewards. Most subjects exhibit monotonicity in performance w...
