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作者：von Negenborn, Colin; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; University of Bonn
摘要：We show that mechanisms which generate endogenous asymmetric information fully mitigate collusion. In our model, an agent has private information and a supervisor observes a signal that is correlated with the agent's type. Agent and supervisor can form collusive side agreements. We study the implementation of social choice functions that condition on the agent's type and the supervisory signal. Our main result establishes that any social choice function that is implementable if the signal is p...
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作者：Aygun, Orhan; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Bogazici University; Iowa State University
摘要：We study a school choice problem under affirmative action policies where authorities reserve a certain fraction of the slots at each school for specific student groups, and where students have preferences not only over the schools they are matched to but also the type of slots they receive. Such reservation policies might cause waste in instances of low demand from some student groups. To propose a solution to this issue, we construct a family of choice functions, dynamic reserves choice funct...
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作者：Carmona, Guilherme; Podczeck, Konrad
作者单位：University of Surrey
摘要：We consider Nash equilibria of large anonymous games (i.e., each player's payoff depends on his choice and the distribution of the choices made by others). We show that pure strategy Nash equilibria exist in all sufficiently large finite-player games with finite action spaces and for generic distributions of players' payoff functions. We also show that equilibrium distributions of non-atomic games are asymptotically implementable in terms of Nash equilibria of large finite-player games. Extens...
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作者：Cheremukhin, Anton; Restrepo-Echavarria, Paulina; Tutino, Antonella
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Dallas; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - St. Louis
摘要：We propose a parsimonious matching model where a person's choice of whom to meet endogenizes the degree of randomness in matching. The analysis highlights the interaction between a productive motive, driven by the surplus attainable in a match, and a strategic motive, driven by reciprocity of interest of potential matches. We find that the interaction between these two motives differs with preferences-vertical versus horizontal-and that this interaction implies that preferences recovered using...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：I study mechanism design settings with quasi-linear utility where the principal can provide agents with additional private information about their valuations beyond the private information they hold at the outset. I demonstrate that the principal can design information and a mechanism so as to implement the same outcome as if the additional information was publicly known. The key idea is that the principal secretly randomizes over information structures which allows her to cross-check the cons...
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作者：Cao, Dan
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：This paper uses the tools developed in the literature on dynamically incomplete markets with finite agents to study the large economy with a continuum of agents and both aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks in Krusell and Smith (1998). It establishes the existence of sequential competitive equilibrium, generalized recursive equilibrium, recursive equilibrium with an extended-state space, and characterizes several important properties of the equilibrium variables. The equilibrium process admits a...
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作者：Bochet, Olivier; Tumennasan, Norovsambuu
作者单位：New York University; New York University Abu Dhabi; Dalhousie University
摘要：Truthtelling is often viewed as focal in the direct mechanisms associated with strategy-proof decision rules. Yet many direct mechanisms also admit Nash equilibria whose outcomes differ from the one under truthtelling. We study a model that has been widely discussed in the mechanism design literature (Sprumont, 1991) and whose strategy-proof and efficient rules typically suffer from the aforementioned deficit. We show that when a rule in this class satisfies the mild additional requirement of ...
