-
作者：Feng, Yue; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：Nanjing University; University of Kansas
摘要：Strategic complements are well understood for normal form games, but less so for extensive form games. There is some evidence that extensive form games with strategic complementarities are a very restrictive class of games (Echenique (2004)). We study necessary and sufficient conditions for strategic complements (defined as increasing best responses) in two stage, 2 x 2 games. We find that the restrictiveness imposed by quasisupermodularity and single crossing property is particularly severe, ...
-
作者：Chade, Hector; Schlee, Edward E.
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：The standard monopoly insurance model with adverse selection implies that there are always gains to trade, that only the best (unobservable) risks can go uninsured, and that a profit-maximizing menu cannot pool all types. We show that insurance-provision costs can explain both coverage denials only to those likely to be the worst risks and complete pooling. Specifically, we prove a general comparative statics theorem formalizing coverage denials only to those deemed to be the worst risks; and ...
-
作者：Ebert, Sebastian; Wei, Wei; Zhou, Xun Yu
作者单位：Frankfurt School Finance & Management; Heriot Watt University; Columbia University
摘要：This paper presents the class of weighted discount functions, which contains the discount functions commonly used in economics and finance. Weighted discount functions may describe the discounting behavior of groups, uncertainty about what discount rate to use, present-biased time preferences, and all of these simultaneously. As an application, we study investment behavior under weighted discounting and come up with the following general result: Greater group diversity, greater parameter uncer...
-
作者：Lebeau, Lucie
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Irvine
摘要：This paper formalizes a Nash bargaining game between two players constrained by capacity decisions made prior to entering the negotiation. In equilibrium, strategic interactions drive capacity choices to zero and shut trade down despite the existence of gains from trade. The game is embedded in a general equilibrium model of decentralized asset trade with credit frictions to investigate the interaction between availability of credit and investors' participation, modeled through their choices o...
-
作者：Spiro, Daniel
作者单位：Uppsala University
摘要：This paper explores intergenerational transmission of culture and the consequences of a plausible assumption: that people care not only for their children's culture but also for how their grandchildren and later generations are raised. This departs from the previous literature which, without exception, assumes parents either do not care about, or fail to consider, the effect their actions have on all future generations. The current paper models a sequential game where parents take actions trad...
-
作者：Chen, Yi
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：A revision game of experimentation is examined in which players search for an unknown threshold. Each player encounters individual random opportunities to revise her own action. Lower action saves flow cost, but the player whose action falls below the threshold suffers a costly breakdown and exits the game. The set of symmetric pure-strategy Markov equilibria has a simple characterization. The difference between these equilibria vanishes as the revision opportunity becomes infinitely frequent....
-
作者：Li, Yunan
作者单位：City University of Hong Kong
摘要：A principal allocates an object (e.g., a job or grant) among several agents, each of whom wants the object and privately knows the value to the principal of assigning it to him. The object is allocated based on the agents' reports. The principal can choose to inspect an agent's report at a cost and impose a limited punishment on the one who receives the object. An optimal mechanism specifies two thresholds upsilon(l) <= upsilon(u). If every agent reports a value below upsilon(l), the object is...
-
作者：Bierbrauer, Felix; Winkelmann, Justus
作者单位：University of Cologne; University of Bonn
摘要：We study public goods provision subject to ex post incentive and participation constraints. We also impose a requirement of anonymity. Different public goods can be bundled if sufficient resources are available. The analysis focuses on the all-or-nothing-mechanism: Expand provision as much as is resource feasible if no one vetoes - otherwise stick to the status quo. We show that the probability of the all-outcome converges to one as the capacity becomes unbounded. For a given finite capacity, ...
-
作者：Ushchev, Philip; Zenou, Yves
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Monash University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Although the linear-in-means model is the workhorse model in empirical work on peer effects, its theoretical properties are understudied. In this study, we develop a social-norm model that provides a micro-foundation of the linear-in-means model and investigate its properties. We show that individual outcomes may increase, decrease, or vary non-monotonically with the taste for conformity. Equilibria are usually inefficient and, to restore the first best, the planner needs to subsidize (tax) ag...
-
作者：Casajus, Andre; Kramm, Michael; Wiese, Harald
作者单位：HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management; Dortmund University of Technology; Leipzig University
摘要：We derive population dynamics from finite cooperative games with transferable utility, where the players are interpreted as types of individuals. We show that any asymptotically stable population profile is characterized by a coalition: while the types in the coalition have the same positive share, the other types vanish. The average productivity of such a stable coalition must be greater than the average productivity of any proper sub- or supercoalition. In simple monotonic games, this means ...
