Matching with myopic and farsighted players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Mauleon, Ana; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
• 署名单位: Maastricht University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105125
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Marriage problems; Stable sets; Myopic and farsighted players

摘要

We introduce the new notion of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set to study stable matchings under the assumption that players can be both myopic and farsighted. For the special case where all players are myopic, our concept predicts the set of matchings in the core. When all players are farsighted, we provide the characterization of pairwise myopic-farsighted stable sets: a set of matchings is a pairwise myopic farsighted stable set if and only if it is a singleton consisting of a core element. This result confirms the result obtained by Mauleon et al. (2011) with a completely different effectivity function and provides a new special case where the farsighted stable set is absolutely maximal (Ray and Vohra, 2019) and coincides with the Strong Rational Expectations Farsighted Stable Set (Dutta and Vohra, 2017). When myopic and farsighted players interact, matchings outside the core can be stable and the most farsighted side can achieve its optimal stable matching. (C) 2020 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.