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作者：Korpela, Ville; Lombardi, Michele; Vartiainen, Hannu
作者单位：University of Turku; University of Glasgow; University of Helsinki
摘要：In this paper, we re-examine the classical questions of implementation theory under complete information in a setting where coalitions are fundamental behavioral units, and the outcomes of their interactions are predicted by applying the solution concept of the core. The planner's exercise includes designing a code of rights that specifies the collection of coalitions having the right to block one outcome by moving to another. A code of individual rights is a code of rights in which only unit ...
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作者：Drugov, Mikhail; Ryvkin, Dmitry
作者单位：New Economic School; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Heavy-tailed fluctuations are common in many environments, such as sales of creative and innovative products or the financial sector. We study how the presence of heavy tails in the distribution of shocks affects the optimal allocation of prizes in rank-order tournaments a la Lazear and Rosen (1981). While a winner take-all prize schedule maximizes aggregate effort for light-tailed shocks, prize sharing becomes optimal when shocks acquire heavy tails, increasingly so following a skewness order...
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作者：Leslie, David S.; Perkins, Steven; Xu, Zibo
作者单位：Lancaster University; Singapore University of Technology & Design
摘要：We define and analyse three learning dynamics for two-player zero-sum discounted-payoff stochastic games. A continuous-time best-response dynamic in mixed strategies is proved to converge to the set of Nash equilibrium stationary strategies. Extending this, we introduce a fictitious-play-like process in a continuous-time embedding of a stochastic zero-sum game, which is again shown to converge to the set of Nash equilibrium strategies. Finally, we present a modified 8-converging best-response ...
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作者：Osawa, Minoru; Akamatsu, Takashi
作者单位：Tohoku University
摘要：Using the theory of potential games, this paper addresses the emergence of polycentric structures in cities that result from trade-offs between agglomeration economies and congestion effects. We consider a model that explains the formation of multiple business centers in cities as an equilibrium outcome under the presence of households' commuting costs and positive technological externalities between firms. We show that the model is a large-population (non-atomic) potential game. To elucidate ...
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作者：Anderson, Simon P.; Peitz, Martin
作者单位：University of Virginia; University of Mannheim; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Leibniz Association; Zentrum fur Europaische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
摘要：We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study media platforms which may differ by popularity. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if total platform profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser surplus t...
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作者：Sandholm, William H.; Izquierdo, Segismundo S.; Izquierdo, Luis R.
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Universidad de Valladolid; Universidad de Burgos
摘要：We study a family of population game dynamics under which each revising agent randomly selects a set of strategies according to a given test-set rule; tests each strategy in this set a fixed number of times, with each play of each strategy being against a newly drawn opponent; and chooses the strategy whose total payoff was highest, breaking ties according to a given tie-breaking rule. These dynamics need not respect dominance and related properties except as the number of trials become large....
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作者：Clausen, Andrew; Strub, Carlo
作者单位：University of Edinburgh; University of St Gallen
摘要：Nested optimization problems arise when an agent must take into account the effect of their decisions on their own future behaviour, or the behaviour of others. In these problems, calculating marginal costs and benefits involves differentiating the solutions to nested problems. But are these solutions differentiable functions? We develop a tool called Reverse Calculus, and establish first-order conditions for (i) a Stackel-berg leader considering the follower's best response function, (ii) a s...
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作者：Mensch, Jeffrey
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：Many important economic situations, such as auctions and signaling games, can be modeled as dynamic games of incomplete information with strategic complementarities of actions and types. In this paper, we extend the results of Athey (2001) and Reny (2011) from static Bayesian games to dynamic environments with observable actions, providing conditions that guarantee the existence of monotone equilibria in types in such games. A feature that distinguishes this environment from those of previous ...
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作者：Abdellaoui, Mohammed; Wakker, Peter P.
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC
摘要：Savage's foundation of expected utility is considered to be the most convincing justification of Bayesian expected utility and the crowning glory of decision theory. It combines exceptionally appealing axioms with deep mathematics. Despite the wide influence and deep respect that Savage received in economics and statistics, virtually no one touched his mathematical tools. We provide an updated analysis that is more general and more accessible. Our derivations are self-contained. This helps to ...
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作者：Alger, Ingela; Weibull, Jorgen W.; Lehmann, Laurent
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Stockholm School of Economics; University of Lausanne
摘要：During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conflicts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals' preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in...
