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作者：Chade, Hector; Swinkels, Jeroen
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Northwestern University
摘要：We study the moral-hazard problem when the agent's reservation utility is large, but so is the agent's value to the principal. We show that the principal's cost of implementing effort has a very simple limiting form. For large enough outside option, the principal's cost is convex in the action, so the optimally-implemented action is unique, and optimal effort rises with the agent's ability, and falls with the agent's wealth and outside option. In a competitive market setting where heterogenous...
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作者：Albrecht, James; Cai, Xiaoming; Gautier, Pieter; Vroman, Susan
作者单位：Georgetown University; IZA Institute Labor Economics; Peking University; Peking University Shenzhen Graduate School (PKU Shenzhen); Tinbergen Institute; Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by the firm's candidate. When the contract space includes application fees, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria of which only one is efficient, and it has a posted wage equal to match output. In the inefficient equilibria, the wage is ...
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作者：March, Christoph; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony
作者单位：Queens University Belfast
摘要：We report a laboratory experiment that tests the causal impact of altruism on observational learning behavior. Once endowed with a private signal, subjects submit their guess about the payoff-relevant state in two parallel sequences. In the observed sequence, guesses are revealed publicly so that subjects in both sequences can benefit from guesses that are informative. Unobserved guesses, on the other hand, never reveal any information to others as they remain private. We find that observed gu...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Sturrock, David
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：We present a novel mechanism that explains how nonenforceable communication about future actions has the capacity to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where each player, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, makes a cheap talk promise to his partner about his own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur int...
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作者：Airaudo, Marco
作者单位：Drexel University
摘要：Motivated by the extensive experimental and empirical evidence on preference reversal in consumption choices, we introduce temptation with self-control preferences into a New Keynesian model to study the effects of forward guidance in monetary policy, and the related forward guidance puzzle. In our setup, the representative agent faces a trade off between the temptation for immediate satisfaction (liquidate wealth) with his long-run best (smooth consumption), which he manages by exerting cogni...
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作者：Dziewulski, Pawel
作者单位：University of Sussex
摘要：Despite its ad hoc nature and lack of an appealing economic interpretation, the critical cost-efficiency index (or CCEI) proposed in Afriat (1973) is one of the most widespread measures of departures from rationality. In this paper, we provide a behavioural foundation for this index by showing that it is equivalent to a notion of the just-noticeable difference - a measure of dissimilarity between alternatives that is sufficient for the agent to tell them apart. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All right...
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作者：Zannini, Ugo
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Luiss Guido Carli University
摘要：In a monetary economy a la Williamson (2012), in which a competitive financial sector insures agents facing idiosyncratic liquidity risk on interest-bearing assets, we introduce a competitive market for liquidity reallocation and study optimal policy. We show that, at any inflation rate above the Friedman rule, the market is a welfare-improving risk-sharing mechanism over Williamson's (2012) deposit contract. The optimal policy requires real asset scarcity, which increases the demand for money...
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作者：Shell, Karl
作者单位：Cornell University
摘要：This introduces the 50th anniversary issue of JET, a collection of 50 influential articles published in the Journal over the first fifty years. These papers speak for themselves. Instead of summarizing them, I offer my takes on the histories of the Journal, scientific publishing, and the economic theory profession. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Alaoui, Larbi; Janezic, Katharina A.; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：Pompeu Fabra University; Barcelona School of Economics; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Recent experiments suggest that level-k behavior is often driven by subjects' beliefs, rather than their binding cognitive bounds. But the extent to which this is true in general is not completely understood, mainly because disentangling 'cognitive' and 'behavioral' levels is challenging experimentally and theoretically. In this paper we provide a simple experimental design strategy (the 'tutorial method') to disentangle the two concepts purely based on subjects' choices. We also provide a 're...
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作者：Ghirardato, Paolo; Pennesi, Daniele
作者单位：University of Turin; Collegio Carlo Alberto; University of Turin
摘要：We provide, and characterize behaviorally, a framework for constructing subjective mixtures which requires neither the Certainty Independence nor the Monotonicity axiom, replacing them with much weaker local properties. As we also show by means of examples, this framework provides a purely subjective foundation to most of the recent preference models which employ the Anscombe-Aumann setting. It also allows a subjective formulation of a preference for ambiguity hedging, and as a consequence all...
