Implementation of assortative matching under incomplete information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Utgoff, Naomi
• 署名单位: United States Department of Defense; United States Navy; United States Naval Academy
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2020.105054
• 发表日期: 2020
• 关键词: Matching; market design; auctions; mechanism design

摘要

This paper provides a unifying framework for matching markets with incomplete information in which the positive assortative match is always efficient. I construct a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves-like mechanism which implements the positive assortative match as an ex post Nash equilibrium. It achieves this result by using a payment rule that distinguishes between an agent deprived of any match and an agent who merely receives a reduced match value. The constructed mechanism recognizes only opportunity costs arising from the former, and not the latter, effect. I also generalize the stronger condition of envy freeness to these incomplete information environments and show that the constructed equilibrium is envy free. Published by Elsevier Inc.